Re: [TLS] TLS v1.2 performance (was Re: TLSv1.2 with DSA client

[Sean Turner <[e-mail]>]

On 3/10/11 4:59 PM, Matt DeMoss wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 4, 2011 at 6:41 PM, Martin Rex<[e-mail]>  wrote:
>
>
>>
>> The TLS spec should not mess around with PKI and X.509 issues.
>> Negotiation of the algorithm used for the "digitally signed" struct
>> ought to be _completely_ seperate from characteristics of certificates.
>>
>> A TLS extension to convey hints about digital signature algorithms
>> ought to be a fairly black box to TLS, containing a list of
>> ASN.1 AlgIds, and with the semantic of a "hint to the PKI software
>> for selecting the most appropriate certificates", i.e. "MAY" not "MUST".
>>
>
> This is interesting to me; as a kind of thought experiment do you
> think it would ever be appropriate for TLS to negotiate hash
> algorithms on CRLs or on OCSP responses? It seems unlikely that
> multiple CRLs will be generated with different hashes and that is only
> slightly less true for X.509 certs.
>
> Does it make more sense for TLS to instead negotiate the version of
> X.509 (or PKIX profile, or other credential) in use and hope some
> future version will provide functionality for a smoother transition? I
> read RFC 5280 to say there can only be one signature per certificate,
> but it isn't hard to imagine having doubly signed certificates in the
> future.

Reinventing X.509 PKI ought to be done in PKIX ;)

spt