Re: [TLS] TLS Proxy Server Extension
Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com> Sat, 30 July 2011 02:31 UTC
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From: Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>
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To: mcgrew@cisco.com
Date: Sat, 30 Jul 2011 04:30:57 +0200
In-Reply-To: <D142B8F0-3F3C-4D69-918E-C15F42E84CBF@cisco.com> from "David McGrew" at Jul 29, 11 03:24:09 pm
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Cc: tls@ietf.org, pgladstone@cisco.com
Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS Proxy Server Extension
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David McGrew wrote: > > On Jul 29, 2011, at 1:44 PM, Martin Rex wrote: > > > > Matt McCutchen wrote: > >> > >> On Wed, 2011-07-27 at 20:17 +0200, Martin Rex wrote: > >>> Only for Web-Browser scenario can I personally see a very limited > >>> value that does not amount to 100% wiretapping. > >>> > >>> Are you aware of rfc2804 "IETF Policy on Wiretapping"? > >>> > >>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2804 > >>> > >>> Standardizing MITM attacks on TLS-protected communication > >>> ("lawful intercept?") seems like an extremely bad idea to me. > >> > >> This is not wiretapping as defined in that policy. On the contrary, it is EXACTLY wiretapping _as_meant_by_rfc2804_. > > Right, it's clearly not wiretapping as per RFC 2804: "Wiretapping is > what occurs when information passed across the Internet from one party > to one or more other parties is delivered to a third party: 1. Without > the sending party knowing about the third party ..." The intent of > the work we are discussing is to ensure that the client knows about > the third party. As Marsh Ray previously pointed out... ...the server might be sending a response, and due to the server not knowing about the MitM on the communication link to the client this falls within the description and intent of RFC2804. In Germany such a TLS proxy will always and unconditionally fall under the constitutional protection of telecommunications (Art 10 Abs. 1 GG), unless **ALL** communication parties have consciously agreed. (it would fall under the less stringent constitutional protection of informational self-determination of the sender of information when communication contents were leaked only at a rightful TLS endpoint as conceived by the information sender, which is _still_ a very serious legal problem where I live). > > > > > I *STRONGLY* disagree. That is very much about wiretapping and > > even goes far beyond that, because it not only reveals the content > > of the communication, it also allows the "TLS proxy" to arbitrarily > > manipulate the communication in a fashion that might be entirely > > concealed to the communication peers at the end. > > > > > > I am strongly opposed to have any document describing such proxies > > published as an RFC! > > And yet you would favor a protocol that propagates decryption keys > around the network? That approach would ensure communication integrity and keep client certificates functional. Favour? No, but it is by a huge margin the lesser evil and the lesser security problem when compared to a TLS-terminating proxy with a super-CA-equivent keypair that can fake every server cert and surreptitiously modify all comunications, which completely precludes control and accountability through technical/protocol safeguards. > > We don't have a choice about whether or not TLS proxying will be done > on the Internet; it is being done. What we can choose is whether or > not the IETF improves how it is being done. The IETF does not have a choice whether law enforcement does wiretap, yet it refuses to work on and standarize technology that provides or facilitates such activities. -Martin
- [TLS] TLS Proxy Server Extension David McGrew
- Re: [TLS] TLS Proxy Server Extension Yngve N. Pettersen
- Re: [TLS] TLS Proxy Server Extension David McGrew
- Re: [TLS] TLS Proxy Server Extension Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] TLS Proxy Server Extension Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] TLS Proxy Server Extension Adam Langley
- Re: [TLS] TLS Proxy Server Extension Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] TLS Proxy Server Extension Adam Langley
- Re: [TLS] TLS Proxy Server Extension David McGrew
- Re: [TLS] TLS Proxy Server Extension David McGrew
- Re: [TLS] TLS Proxy Server Extension David McGrew
- Re: [TLS] TLS Proxy Server Extension Matt McCutchen
- [TLS] Certificate pins vs. MITM proxies Matt McCutchen
- Re: [TLS] TLS Proxy Server Extension Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] TLS Proxy Server Extension Matt McCutchen
- Re: [TLS] TLS Proxy Server Extension Matt McCutchen
- Re: [TLS] TLS Proxy Server Extension Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] TLS Proxy Server Extension Marsh Ray
- Re: [TLS] TLS Proxy Server Extension Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] TLS Proxy Server Extension Marsh Ray
- Re: [TLS] TLS Proxy Server Extension David McGrew
- Re: [TLS] TLS Proxy Server Extension David McGrew
- Re: [TLS] TLS Proxy Server Extension David McGrew
- Re: [TLS] TLS Proxy Server Extension David McGrew
- Re: [TLS] TLS Proxy Server Extension Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] TLS Proxy Server Extension David McGrew
- Re: [TLS] TLS Proxy Server Extension Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] TLS Proxy Server Extension Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] TLS Proxy Server Extension Marsh Ray
- Re: [TLS] TLS Proxy Server Extension David McGrew
- Re: [TLS] TLS Proxy Server Extension David McGrew
- Re: [TLS] TLS Proxy Server Extension Marsh Ray
- Re: [TLS] TLS Proxy Server Extension Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] TLS Proxy Server Extension David McGrew
- Re: [TLS] TLS Proxy Server Extension David McGrew
- Re: [TLS] TLS Proxy Server Extension David McGrew
- Re: [TLS] TLS Proxy Server Extension Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] TLS Proxy Server Extension Marsh Ray
- Re: [TLS] TLS Proxy Server Extension Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] TLS Proxy Server Extension Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] TLS Proxy Server Extension Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] TLS Proxy Server Extension David McGrew
- Re: [TLS] TLS Proxy Server Extension David McGrew
- Re: [TLS] TLS Proxy Server Extension Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] TLS Proxy Server Extension David McGrew
- Re: [TLS] TLS Proxy Server Extension Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] TLS Proxy Server Extension Anders Rundgren
- Re: [TLS] TLS Proxy Server Extension Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] TLS Proxy Server Extension Ken Peirce
- Re: [TLS] TLS Proxy Server Extension Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] TLS Proxy Server Extension Matt McCutchen
- Re: [TLS] TLS Proxy Server Extension Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] TLS Proxy Server Extension Joshua Davies
- Re: [TLS] TLS Proxy Server Extension Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] TLS Proxy Server Extension Ken Peirce
- Re: [TLS] TLS Proxy Server Extension Philip Gladstone
- Re: [TLS] TLS Proxy Server Extension Kemp, David P.
- Re: [TLS] TLS Proxy Server Extension David McGrew
- Re: [TLS] TLS Proxy Server Extension Ralph Holz