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Re: [TLS] datacenter TLS decryption as a three-party protocol

Colm MacCárthaigh <colm@allcosts.net> Thu, 20 July 2017 06:57 UTC

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From: Colm MacCárthaigh <colm@allcosts.net>
Date: Wed, 19 Jul 2017 23:57:03 -0700
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To: Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>
Cc: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] datacenter TLS decryption as a three-party protocol
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On Wed, Jul 19, 2017 at 11:40 PM, Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>
wrote:

> Hi Colm,
>
>
>
>    - Today browsers do turn on wiretapping support in the normal case.
>    There's nothing they can do about it, and it works right now.
>
> This is news to me; which browsers do this (so that I can avoid using
> them)?
>

Like I said, all of them. I don't know of a single browser that forces
DH-only and insists on unique DH parameters today, and it wouldn't be
practical.  So if we're going to refer to an operator who has the server's
private key using their own key to decrypt traffic as wire-tapping, then in
those terms currently all browsers have support for that turned on, as it's
part of existing versions of TLS.

-- 
Colm

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