Re: [TLS] Comments on various things on agenda (Was: Re: TLS Interim - update and agenda)
Ilari Liusvaara <ilari.liusvaara@elisanet.fi> Wed, 11 March 2015 18:56 UTC
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Date: Wed, 11 Mar 2015 20:56:12 +0200
From: Ilari Liusvaara <ilari.liusvaara@elisanet.fi>
To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Comments on various things on agenda (Was: Re: TLS Interim - update and agenda)
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On Wed, Mar 11, 2015 at 08:16:53AM -0700, Watson Ladd wrote: > On Mar 10, 2015 10:19 PM, "Peter Gutmann" <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> wrote: > > > > (and many others). It's already so different even to TLS 1.2 that > there's no > > point in retaining some crufty old artefact of SSL 3.0 just because we've > > always done it this way. If there's a feature that's useful or important > to > > the functioning of the protocol then by all means include it, but there's > no > > point in dragging along old protocol misfeatures "for backwards > compatibility" > > when so much else has changed incompatibly. > > I agree. We should focus in simplifying implementations of TLS 1.3 and TLS > 1.2, and it seems that this means assuming minimal (read none) code reuse, > and focusing on simplifying TLS 1.3 on its own terms. The kind of backward compatiblity I am talking about: - Be able to do secure downnegotiation to TLS 1.2. - Don't break protocols using TLS. These would impose the following constraints: - The first flight can only have TLS 1.2-compatible ClientHello (unless server is known to be 1.3-capable and client is prepared to take heavy latencies otherwise). - The second flight has to be always distinguishable from TLS 1.2. (recordversion field should do here?) - Not using record types (first byte of record) outside 20-63 range. - TLS-Unique and TLS-Exporter APIs are still there. The following are examples of changes outside scope of backwards compat: - Removing recordversion from encrypted records. - Redefining recordtype values (within range, some of that already done). - Redefining TLS-Unique and TLS-Exporter internals. - Totally rearranging the handshake (already done) Also, to me the current TLS 1.3 draft looks to be much more hardened against cryptographic attacks than TLS 1.2 (even with session_hash). And the source of this resistance is precisely encrypting as much as possible together with CRK. -Ilari
- [TLS] Comments on various things on agenda (Was: … Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] Comments on various things on agenda (W… Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [TLS] Comments on various things on agenda (W… Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] Comments on various things on agenda (W… Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [TLS] Comments on various things on agenda (W… Peter Gutmann