Re: [TLS] Working Group Last Call for draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00

Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com> Mon, 20 October 2014 11:53 UTC

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Date: Mon, 20 Oct 2014 04:53:18 -0700
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From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
To: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Working Group Last Call for draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00
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On 20 October 2014 04:47, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com> wrote:
> Indeed, there is an arguments to keep that mechanism, as there are still
> some TLS 1.3 intolerant servers. But instead of prolonging the life of
> such an insecure mechanism wouldn't it make sense to fix those broken
> servers instead; e.g., by peer pressure by documenting the
> implementations that are not TLS 1.3-ready in [0]?

I think that we should do that, but as a practical matter, I suspect
that we'll be stuck with some amount of fallback for a while yet.  I
find the TLS 1.3 intolerance numbers pretty alarming in this regard;
even with rapid improvement, I doubt it will go away quickly.