Re: [TLS] Simple, secure 0-RTT for the masses

[Ilari Liusvaara <[e-mail]>]

On Wed, Mar 16, 2016 at 12:33:40AM -0400, Colm MacCárthaigh wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 15, 2016 at 9:38 PM, Bill Cox <[e-mail]> wrote:
> 
> > I would be happy if we could recommend at least one reasonably secure
> > method for 0-RTT for HTTPS that has a reasonable chance of satisfying the
> > skeptics, and then state that 0-RTT for other protocols, and stateless
> > 0-RTT, needs to be carefully considered for the application.
> >
> 
> After meditating on this a little, how about something like this:
> 
> Benefits Forward secrecy:
> 
> * Clients SHOULD use a resumption ticket only once, and get a new
> resumption ticket when using an existing one.
> 
> Benefits Forward Secrecy and Idempotence:
> 
> * Client and server should erase the existing ticket upon use.
> 
> (a captured early data section is mooted for replay quite quickly in the
> default "good" case)

The best that can be done w.r.t. "forward secrecy" is to erase the
decryption-capable key used for 0-RTT on both sides, and never sending
it on the wire, even encrypted.

> * Make early data and application data separate record layer content types.
> Make it clear that they do not form a continuous stream; you can't simply
> concatenate them at the application level and bolt on to existing protocols
> such as HTTP, SMTP, etc.

You mean inner (encrypted) content type, right (outer content type would
still be 23[TLS PROTECTED DATA]?

> * Advise that clients using 0RTT SHOULD occasionally send duplicate early
> data handshakes. As a normal part of the protocol, a well behaved client
> should intentionally do what an attacker might do and send the whole
> section twice, causing the server to resolve the duplication. Keep the
> anti-bodies strong.

Such duplication does not occur in attack conditions. The duplication
from attack conditions takes two forms:

- Duplication of 0-RTT data into 1-RTT data of _different_ connection.
- Duplication of 0-RTT data into 0-RTT data of _different_ connection.

In both cases, the connections are different, not the same. And this
makes a difference if e.g. protocol banners are sent as 0-RTT (and
such may very well be critical for latency).


-Ilari