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Re: [TLS] Ala Carte Cipher suites - was: DSA should die

Brian Smith <brian@briansmith.org> Tue, 14 April 2015 00:50 UTC

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Date: Mon, 13 Apr 2015 14:50:02 -1000
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From: Brian Smith <brian@briansmith.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Ala Carte Cipher suites - was: DSA should die
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Brian Smith <brian@briansmith.org> wrote:
> One example: Firefox intentionally enabled
> TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 and
> TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 without enable the the TLS_RSA_*
> or TLS_DHE_* variants, partly to encourage people to move away from
> TLS_DHE and especially TLS_RSA key exchange, and partly because of
> security concerns regarding TLS_DHE and TLS_RSA key exchange.

Also, some servers received an update that enabled only the TLS_DHE_*
and TLS_RSA_* variants of those AES-GCM cipher suites, but that update
was broken so that handshakes that used those cipher suites would
fail. So, being able to have TLS_DHE_* and TLS_RSA_* variants of the
AES-GCM cipher suites disabled while the TLS_ECDHE_* cipher suites
stayed enabled has had interoperability benefits. (There is a patch
available that fixes the bug in those servers, but even months later
not all the servers have applied the patch.)

Cheers,
Brian

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