Re: [TLS] analysis of wider impact of TLS1.3 replayabe data

Ryan Hamilton <rch@google.com> Mon, 14 March 2016 20:47 UTC

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Date: Mon, 14 Mar 2016 13:47:43 -0700
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From: Ryan Hamilton <rch@google.com>
To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
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Cc: Geoffrey Keating <geoffk@geoffk.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] analysis of wider impact of TLS1.3 replayabe data
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On Mon, Mar 14, 2016 at 12:25 PM, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com>; wrote:

> > It's worth keeping in mind this recent paper about Replay attacks
> against HTTPS. TL;DR: Attackers can already force a browser to replay
> requests basically at will. ​As a result, it's not clear that 0-RTT replay
> makes this situation worse.
>
> TLS is more than just browsers, which is what started this thread I think
>

I was responding to a comment about HTTP, though :> I agree that the
implications of 0-RTT for other applications will be different.​