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Re: [TLS] Summarizing identity change discussion so far

Kyle Hamilton <aerowolf@gmail.com> Thu, 17 December 2009 21:37 UTC

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Date: Thu, 17 Dec 2009 13:37:15 -0800
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From: Kyle Hamilton <aerowolf@gmail.com>
To: Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com
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Cc: tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] Summarizing identity change discussion so far
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On Tue, Dec 8, 2009 at 1:13 AM,  <Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com> wrote:
> (wearing Area Director hat)
>
> - We recommend that TLS libraries SHOULD provide identity matching
> (with memcmp, abort handshake if changed) functionality to
> applications, and SHOULD allow applications to enable/disable this
> functionality.

No, identity matching SHOULD be done in accordance with PKIX.  memcmp
is not at all sufficient.

However, I would support the following:

- TLS libraries SHOULD provide identity matching services between and
throughout renegotiation handshakes.  Libraries SHOULD implement this
in accordance with PKIX [PKIX], but MAY do so with a direct memory
comparison.  Implementors are cautioned that this latter approach does
not provide for changing the cipher parameters -- such as a
renegotiation with an EC or DH certificate after identification with
an RSA certificate.  If the identity matching service fails to match
the identity, implementations MUST abort the handshake with a fatal
bad_certificate alert.

-Kyle H

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