Re: [TLS] add challenge in TLS v1.3 to prevent DDOS attack?

Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> Mon, 08 June 2015 11:30 UTC

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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: Bingzheng Wu <bingzheng.wbz@alibaba-inc.com>, 'tls' <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] add challenge in TLS v1.3 to prevent DDOS attack?
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Date: Mon, 8 Jun 2015 11:30:50 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] add challenge in TLS v1.3 to prevent DDOS attack?
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Bingzheng Wu <bingzheng.wbz@alibaba-inc.com> writes:

>The tls-auth requires the client and server have PSK.

Sure, this is for the situation where you have known clients connecting to a
server (e.g. SCADA devices), not for general-purpose web use where you have an
arbitrary number of unknown clients connecting.  So that's one more note for
the RFC draft, be explicit about the scope...

Peter.