Re: [TLS] draft-ietf-tls-tls-13-17 posted

Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Thu, 20 October 2016 19:52 UTC

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Thu, 20 Oct 2016 12:51:35 -0700
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To: Kazuho Oku <kazuhooku@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-ietf-tls-tls-13-17 posted
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You're right. I just missed it. Added to the editor's copy.

Thanks,
-Ekr


On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 12:43 PM, Kazuho Oku <kazuhooku@gmail.com>; wrote:

> Hello,
>
> It's great to see draft-17 being published. Thank you all for the effort.
>
> Maybe the addition of extensions field to the Certificate message got
> lost in the changelog?
> https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/654
>
> My understanding has been that it was a post-16 change and it changes
> the wire protocol.
>
>
> 2016-10-21 1:32 GMT+09:00 Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>;:
> > Folks,
> >
> > I have just uploaded draft-ietf-tls-tls13-17.
> >
> > The major change in this draft is the removal of the 0-RTT Finished
> > and resumption_context constructs and their replacement with the
> > psk_binder. This has a number of side effects:
> >
> > - Binds in the original transcript into the resumed handshake
> >   whenever resumption-PSK is used.
> >
> > - Provides proof of possession of the RMS by the client (subject
> >   to replay issues). I've moved the obfuscated_ticket_age field
> >   out of the early_data_indication so that it now provides the
> >   same limited anti-replay for non-0-RTT PSK.
> >
> > - Removes the need for any early handshake encryption. This change,
> >   along with the dual key ladders we introduced in -16, also allowed
> >   us to simplify the traffic key expansion so we don't need explicit
> >   labels for each key (they are already used in Derive-Secret).
> >
> >
> > Other changes included:
> > - Tweaking the PSK key exchange modes a bit (and removing the
> >   inoperative ability to specify PSK auth modes, while leaving
> >   a hook to do it later).
> >
> > - Cleaned up the cipher suite requirements for resumption and 0-RTT.
> >   You can resume/do PSK as long as the PSK KDF matches, but to do 0-RTT
> >   you need the whole cipher suite must match.
> >
> >
> > This revision resolves all the outstanding technical PRs [0] and all but
> > one of the non-parked technical issues (#144, whether we should remove
> the
> > redundant TLSCipherText.opaque_type and TLSCipherText.record_version
> > fields). We are pursuing measurements to resolve whether this will
> > be a compat problem but we don't have them yet.
> >
> > As usual, comments welcome. We are already working on implementing
> > -17 in NSS/Firefox and should have it before Seoul.
> >
> > -Ekr
> >
> > Full Changelog
> > - Remove the 0-RTT Finished, resumption_context, and replace with a
> >   psk_binder field in the PSK itself (*)
> >
> > - Restructure PSK key exchange negotiation modes (*)
> >
> > - Add max_early_data_size field to TicketEarlyDataInfo (*)
> >
> > - Add a 0-RTT exporter and change the transcript for the regular exporter
> > (*)
> >
> > - Merge TicketExtensions and Extensions registry. Changes
> >   ticket_early_data_info code point (*)
> >
> > - Replace Client.key_shares in response to HRR (*)
> >
> > - Remove redundant labels for traffic key derivation (*)
> >
> > - Harmonize requirements about cipher suite matching: for resumption you
> >   need to match KDF but for 0-RTT you need whole cipher suite. This
> >   allows PSKs to actually negotiate cipher suites. (*)
> >
> > - Explicitly allow non-offered extensions in NewSessionTicket
> >
> > - Explicitly allow predicting ClientFinished for NST
> >
> > - Clarify conditions for allowing 0-RTT with PSK
> >
> >
> > [0] The two remaining outstanding PRs are:
> > #680: Forbid post-handshake authentication except when permitted by
> >       application profile. This is almost entirely a requirements-level
> >       change, though it would allow clients to send "unexpected_message"
> >       when receiving an unexpected CertificateRequest.
> >
> > #612: TLS 1.3 -> TLS 2.0
> >       This has no change on the wire format.
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > TLS mailing list
> > TLS@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
> >
>
>
>
> --
> Kazuho Oku
>