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Re: [TLS] some thoughts on dnssec-chain-extension, pinning, and broader semantics

Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> Tue, 06 November 2018 02:54 UTC

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Date: Mon, 05 Nov 2018 21:54:19 -0500
From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] some thoughts on dnssec-chain-extension, pinning, and broader semantics
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On Mon, 5 Nov 2018, Salz, Rich wrote:

> Is it fair to describe the draft as enabling a trust model based on DNSSEC, rather than the default X.509 hierarchy and trust store which is implemented by default?

The draft tries to enable a trust model based on DNSSEC, but due to
missing pinning, fails to deliver that.

A better way is saying the draft enables a trust model that restricts
the webpki, addressing the problems of too many unrestricted root CA
players being accepted by  TLS clients these days [provided the draft
adds a mechanism like pinning to prevent downgrade attacks]

Paul

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