Re: [TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-chacha20-poly1305-00.txt

[Jeffrey Walton <[e-mail]>]

>>> What is the use-case?
>>
>> 0.   Authentication other than via certificate-based PKI.  Establish
>>      anon TLS, and channel-bind the TLS-unique via GSSAPI or some
>>      other authentication method.
>>
>> 1.  Unauthenticated opportunistic TLS.
>>
>>     * Server performs no unnecessary signature operations,
>>       since the client can't verify the signature anyway.
>>       (More precisely the client can't verify the authenticity
>>       of the server keys, so it can only determine that somebody
>>       signed the handshake, but no idea whether it is the intended
>>       server).
>
> Both those use-cases can be achieved by choosing, say, ECDHE_ECDSA and
> not verify the signature, right?
>
That's a violation of the engineering requirements :) If you don't
need server authenticity, then you don't ask for it. If you ask for
it, then you have to validate it.

I know I'm splitting hairs, but I would reject that kind of check-in.
I fear a proliferation of
https://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/pubs/abstracts/ssl-client-bugs.html.
It also creates a few extra rules, and we have to teach them to
developers, QA and auditors.

Jeff