Re: [TLS] draft-ietf-tls-cached-info-02 / New "Fast-Track" draft

[Stefan Santesson <[e-mail]>]

Brian,  

The use of hash functions in this draft does not require collision
resistance.
This is actually quite easy to prove.

/Stefan



On 10-02-19 6:05 PM, "Brian Smith" <[e-mail]> wrote:

> Kemp, David P. wrote:
>>     
>>  
>> 
>> Note that the key concept described in secure_hashing.html is ³secure²: 
>>  
>>  
>>  
>> Federal agencies should stop using SHA-1 for digital signatures, digital time
>> stamping and other applications that require collision resistance as soon as
>> practical, and must use the SHA-2 family of hash functions for these
>> applications after 2010.
>>  
>>  
>>  
>> When a hash algorithm is used for non-security purposes, such as database
>> bucketing (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hash_table) or cache object
>> selection, the NIST guidance does not apply.
>>  
> Yes, I read that sentence too. And, I agree with your very common-sense
> interpretation of things. But, while the sentence you quote has the qualifier
> "that require collision resistance," the rest of the recommendations against
> SHA-1 don't have that qualifier, so I am not totally convinced. And, I am
> definitely not convinced that all users/customers will be convinced, so I
> would rather be safe than sorry.
> 
> Perhaps this all can be avoided by simply not having the client calculate
> hashes at all for . For example, would this work?:
> 
> struct {
>     CachedInformationType type;
>     opaque token<0..255>;
> } CachedObject; 
> 
> In a server hello: If CachedObject.token is empty, then the client must use
> its cached value for the given information type. The corresponding fields in
> the server hello (e.g. Certificate.certificate_list or
> CertificateRequest.certificate_authorities) MUST be empty. If
> CachedObject.token is not empty, then the server will send a new value, and
> that new value can be identified by the client in subsequent client hellos
> using the given token; an empty value (e.g. an empty
> Certificate.certificate_authorities) must not be interpreted as an indication
> to use a previously-cached value. For a given value, a server should return
> the same token string to every client, so that the token isn't used as a
> tracking cookie that could be used to distinguish distinct clients. The server
> must ensure that the same token is never used to identify different values
> (that is, every token must map to at most one value). Since the goal of this
> extension is to reduce the number of bytes transmitted, the token should be
> short. It is strongly recommended that the server use a secure hash algorithm
> (e.g. SHA-2) of the value as the token.
> 
> In a client hello: CachedObject.token must not be empty, and it must contain a
> token previously retrieved from the same server (either in a previous TLS
> handshake, or out of band).
> 
> Regards,
> Brian
> 
> 
> 
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