Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3: Deterministic RSA-PSS and ECDSA

Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com> Tue, 09 August 2016 23:10 UTC

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From: Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Aug 2016 16:10:28 -0700
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To: Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3: Deterministic RSA-PSS and ECDSA
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It's also worth noting that BERserk is one of many such incidents of this
coming up in practice:
https://cryptosense.com/why-pkcs1v1-5-signature-should-also-be-put-out-of-our-misery/

On Tue, Aug 9, 2016 at 2:13 PM, Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com>; wrote:

> On Tue, Aug 9, 2016 at 7:16 AM, Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>; wrote:
>
>> BERserk is an implementation defect, not a crypto weakness.
>>
>
> Hence why I phrased the question the way I did. Per Izu, Shimoyama, and
> Takenaka 2006, PKCS#1 v1.5 has sharp edges which implementers must avoid
> (of course, the same can be said of BER in BERserk, and it was clearly the
> bigger of the two problems).
>
> Peter Gutmann's response was the sort of thing I was looking for when I
> originally asked the question.
>
> --
> Tony Arcieri
>



-- 
Tony Arcieri