Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 + PSK with multiple identities

Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com> Mon, 08 August 2016 08:28 UTC

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Date: Mon, 8 Aug 2016 11:28:37 +0300
From: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
To: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 + PSK with multiple identities
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On Mon, Aug 08, 2016 at 10:17:40AM +0200, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos wrote:
> Hello,
>  I'm reading the "Pre-Shared Key Extension" section of the TLS 1.3
> draft [0], and I noticed quite some deviations (IMO) from typical TLS
> protocol behavior. No rationale is given about them so I ask on list.
> 
> To summarize, the client sends a list of identitities and the server
> replies with an index indicating which identity is approved.
> 
> 1. The server reply with an index is unique in TLS. It is not used in
> ciphersuite selection or in any other negotiation in TLS where the
> client sends multiple options. Why not have the server reply with the
> selected username.

More compact and makes the option where server sends some bad option
more clear.
 
> 2. Why does the client send multiple identities? In TLS-SRP a single
> identity is sent, and the same in the existing TLS-PSK rfc. How is this
> envisioned to be used? A client sends: I'm probably one of Bob, Nikos,
> George, take a look on that list and tell me who I really am? In that
> case why not allow the server, to reply with a username outside that
> list (i.e., assign a new one to be used at the next session - see point
> 1).

You already need multiple if you try to "resume"[1] DHE-PSK session
(since "resumption" shares the PSK space).

Additionally, TLS 1.2 had identity hint, but TLS 1.3 eliminates that
due to flight limits.

> 3. The maximum size of the username is 2^16. Isn't that excessive for a
> user name or a user identifier? Why not set 2^8? That would fit a uuid
> or anything similarly large.

If one wants to do the equivalent of tickets in TLS 1.2, one needs
pretty large usernames.



[1] IMO, TLS 1.3 does not have session resumption (doesn't stop others
from calling the relevant features "resumption").


-Ilari