Re: [TLS] Nuking DHE in favour of ECDHE (Was: Re: Confirming Consensus on removing RSA key Transport from TLS 1.3)

Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com> Mon, 31 March 2014 10:36 UTC

Return-Path: <rob.stradling@comodo.com>
X-Original-To: tls@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: tls@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 099731A0698 for <tls@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 31 Mar 2014 03:36:05 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.29
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.29 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, HELO_MISMATCH_NET=0.611, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=no
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id RtyJXkgeLoJ3 for <tls@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 31 Mar 2014 03:36:02 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from ian.brad.office.comodo.net (eth5.brad-fw.brad.office.ccanet.co.uk [178.255.87.226]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C1C251A0678 for <tls@ietf.org>; Mon, 31 Mar 2014 03:36:01 -0700 (PDT)
Received: (qmail 12493 invoked by uid 1000); 31 Mar 2014 10:35:57 -0000
Received: from nigel.brad.office.comodo.net (HELO [192.168.0.58]) (192.168.0.58) (smtp-auth username rob, mechanism plain) by ian.brad.office.comodo.net (qpsmtpd/0.40) with (AES128-SHA encrypted) ESMTPSA; Mon, 31 Mar 2014 11:35:57 +0100
Message-ID: <5339450D.3060306@comodo.com>
Date: Mon, 31 Mar 2014 11:35:57 +0100
From: Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux i686; rv:24.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/24.4.0
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>, Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>, Marsh Ray <maray@microsoft.com>, Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
References: <CABkgnnX=KM4YVf1+znp_HS+Pu6DSw64q1adDC4EOPqRLuTDZKQ@mail.gmail.com> <31dba3a928d145c6835d4bbcfa603354@BY2PR03MB074.namprd03.prod.outlook.com> <5335785F.2070104@fifthhorseman.net> <368f5b8e9f9b49d1b8b1e2600a1b8a49@BL2PR03MB419.namprd03.prod.outlook.com>
In-Reply-To: <368f5b8e9f9b49d1b8b1e2600a1b8a49@BL2PR03MB419.namprd03.prod.outlook.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="ISO-8859-1"; format="flowed"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Archived-At: http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/k6TANPZGvXR4mrGPaQPLY5cyjXI
Cc: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Nuking DHE in favour of ECDHE (Was: Re: Confirming Consensus on removing RSA key Transport from TLS 1.3)
X-BeenThere: tls@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
List-Id: "This is the mailing list for the Transport Layer Security working group of the IETF." <tls.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/tls>, <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/>
List-Post: <mailto:tls@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls>, <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 31 Mar 2014 10:36:05 -0000

On 28/03/14 19:03, Andrei Popov wrote:
>> did SChannel ever support classic DHE with RSA authentication?
>
> "Windows RT 8.1, Windows 8.1, and Windows Server 2012 R2 update spring 2014" adds a couple of DHE_RSA cipher suites:
> TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
> TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256

Andrei, may we therefore assume that "Windows RT 8.1, Windows 8.1, and 
Windows Server 2012 R2 update spring 2014" will also add these 2 ciphers...

TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA256

?

(Marsh wrote "Historically we have opted to provide ECDHE *in place of* 
classic DHE".  I'm trying to figure out if this is still your approach, 
or if you're now doing the opposite!)

Thanks.

> Without this update, schannel supports DHE_DSS (admittedly, not the most widely used auth).
>
> Cheers,
>
> Andrei
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: TLS [mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Daniel Kahn Gillmor
> Sent: Friday, March 28, 2014 6:26 AM
> To: Marsh Ray; Martin Thomson
> Cc: tls@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [TLS] Nuking DHE in favour of ECDHE (Was: Re: Confirming Consensus on removing RSA key Transport from TLS 1.3)
>
> On 03/27/2014 08:17 PM, Marsh Ray wrote:
>> From: Martin Thomson [mailto:martin.thomson@gmail.com]
>>>
>>> On 27 March 2014 16:55, Marsh Ray <maray@microsoft.com> wrote:
>>>> From: TLS [mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Alyssa Rowan
>>>>>
>>>>> Show of hands: who *really* wants to deploy 2048-bit (or above) DHE, when they could have curve25519 instead?
>>>>
>>>> The general consensus at Microsoft is that we like ECDHE much better than the classic DHE.
>>>
>>> I think that this is the general trend, but is it so bad that you would want to prohibit DHE?
>>
>> Historically we have opted to provide ECDHE *in place of* classic DHE.
>
> did SChannel ever support classic DHE with RSA authentication?
>
>   http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa380512%28v=vs.85%29.aspx
>
> suggests that XP and win2003 (which, afaict, were what immediately preceded vista) does not have DHE.  So it looks like ECDHE was just added, but "classic DHE" wasn't in SChannel in the first place, which doesn't sound like ECDHE is "in place of" DHE to me.
>
> or am i misreading the documentation?
>
> 	--dkg
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

-- 
Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online
Office Tel: +44.(0)1274.730505
Office Fax: +44.(0)1274.730909
www.comodo.com

COMODO CA Limited, Registered in England No. 04058690
Registered Office:
   3rd Floor, 26 Office Village, Exchange Quay,
   Trafford Road, Salford, Manchester M5 3EQ

This e-mail and any files transmitted with it are confidential and 
intended solely for the use of the individual or entity to whom they are 
addressed.  If you have received this email in error please notify the 
sender by replying to the e-mail containing this attachment. Replies to 
this email may be monitored by COMODO for operational or business 
reasons. Whilst every endeavour is taken to ensure that e-mails are free 
from viruses, no liability can be accepted and the recipient is 
requested to use their own virus checking software.