Re: [TLS] HelloRetryRequest question (was Re: TLS 1.3 Problem?)
Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com> Wed, 30 September 2020 21:34 UTC
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Date: Wed, 30 Sep 2020 14:34:06 -0700
From: Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com>
To: Michael D'Errico <mike-list@pobox.com>
Cc: tls@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] HelloRetryRequest question (was Re: TLS 1.3 Problem?)
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On Wed, Sep 30, 2020 at 05:24:21PM -0400, Michael D'Errico wrote: > I wrote: > > > Also the server can't be actually stateless since > > it needs to know the HelloRetryRequest message > > for the transcript hash, right? > > How can you even implement stateless HRR with a > pseudo-session-ticket in the "cookie"? The server > needs to know the full HRR message to calculate the > transcript hash, but this can't be part of the ticket > since the ticket is included within the HRR, thus > changing it.... The HRR is presumed to be a deterministic function of the initial ClientHello, and as I discussed in my earlier message, the server can reconstruct the initial ClientHello from the second ClientHello and verify it against the hash in the cookie. -Ben
- [TLS] TLS 1.3 Problem? Michael D'Errico
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 Problem? Ben Smyth
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 Problem? Michael D'Errico
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 Problem? Richard Barnes
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 Problem? Michael D'Errico
- Re: [TLS] HelloRetryRequest question (was Re: TLS… Michael D'Errico
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 Problem? Hannes Tschofenig
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 Problem? Michael D'Errico
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 Problem? Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 Problem? Rob Sayre
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 Problem? Martin Thomson
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 Problem? Michael D'Errico
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 Problem? Ben Smyth
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 Problem? mrex
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 Problem? Martin Thomson
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 Problem? Michael D'Errico
- [TLS] Is stateless HelloRetryRequest worthwhile? … Michael D'Errico
- Re: [TLS] Is stateless HelloRetryRequest worthwhi… Martin Thomson
- Re: [TLS] Is stateless HelloRetryRequest worthwhi… Nico Williams
- Re: [TLS] Is stateless HelloRetryRequest worthwhi… Michael D'Errico
- Re: [TLS] Is stateless HelloRetryRequest worthwhi… Hannes.Tschofenig
- Re: [TLS] Is stateless HelloRetryRequest worthwhi… Michael D'Errico
- Re: [TLS] Is stateless HelloRetryRequest worthwhi… Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] Is stateless HelloRetryRequest worthwhi… Benjamin Kaduk
- [TLS] HelloRetryRequest question (was Re: TLS 1.3… Michael D'Errico
- Re: [TLS] HelloRetryRequest question (was Re: TLS… Michael D'Errico
- Re: [TLS] HelloRetryRequest question (was Re: TLS… Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [TLS] Is stateless HelloRetryRequest worthwhi… Michael D'Errico
- Re: [TLS] Is stateless HelloRetryRequest worthwhi… Rob Sayre
- Re: [TLS] Is stateless HelloRetryRequest worthwhi… Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] Is stateless HelloRetryRequest worthwhi… Michael D'Errico
- Re: [TLS] Is stateless HelloRetryRequest worthwhi… Nick Harper
- Re: [TLS] Is stateless HelloRetryRequest worthwhi… Michael D'Errico
- [TLS] Client attacks on stateless HRR? (was Re: I… Michael D'Errico
- Re: [TLS] Is stateless HelloRetryRequest worthwhi… Michael D'Errico
- Re: [TLS] Is stateless HelloRetryRequest worthwhi… Michael D'Errico
- Re: [TLS] Is stateless HelloRetryRequest worthwhi… Nick Lamb
- Re: [TLS] Is stateless HelloRetryRequest worthwhi… Michael D'Errico
- Re: [TLS] Is stateless HelloRetryRequest worthwhi… Luke Curley