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Re: [TLS] Connection ID Draft

Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Mon, 23 October 2017 21:26 UTC

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Mon, 23 Oct 2017 14:25:59 -0700
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To: Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com>
Cc: yinxinxing <yinxinxing@huawei.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Connection ID Draft
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On Mon, Oct 23, 2017 at 2:22 PM, Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com> wrote:

> On 10/23/2017 07:12 AM, Eric Rescorla wrote:
>
>  Another comment is about symmetrical CID.
>>
>> 1.       Consider a client sends a normal CID (CID length is not zero,
>> named C-CID) to server, but the server doesn’t wants to use client’s CID
>> and sends a CID generated by the server (named S-CID) to the client.
>>
> No. The CID is for the client's benefit, so why would this be useful?
>
>
>> At the same time, client needs to know server has ignored C-CID (which
>> means the downlink application message from the server will not include
>> C-CID), and client will use S-CID in its application message. Will the
>> draft cover this scenario?
>>
> No.
>
>
> That is to say, this draft does not consider symmetrical CIDs at all.
>

You could of course echo the other side's CID, but no.

-Ekr


> -Ben
>
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