[TLS] Re: Mail regarding draft-ietf-tls-mldsa - Small Editorial items

[Bas Westerbaan <[e-mail]>]

Hi Ryan,

Thanks for the review.

On Fri, May 23, 2025 at 11:46 PM Appel, Ryan <ryan.appel=
[e-mail]> wrote:

> Hello all,
>
>
>
> Apologies if there’s any emails that have already gone out for these
> editorial items or if you all already had plans to fix them. I was going
> through the draft today and didn’t see any of these suggested edits in the
> mail archive.
>
> -----------
>
> In section 1. Introduction it states “module-lattice based” NIST defines it in FIPS 204 with a “-” in-between both module and lattice and lattice and based so this should probably be: “module-lattice-based”
>
>
>
> In addition in this section, it says “algorothm” which should be corrected to “algorithm”.
>
> -------------
>
> In section 3. The paragraph beginning “These correspond to…” has the text “variantsadefined” which looks to be a mistyped “a” where a space should be. This should be corrected to “variants defined”
>
>
>
> In the paragraph beginning “The schemes defined in this document…” should probably say that these algorithms must not be used in a TLS version earlier than TLS 1.3. Right now it only precludes version 1.2.
>
>
>
> Throughout RFC 8446, this is referenced as “TLS 1.2 or below”. So the proposed language is to change the first sentence (and others like it) to: “The schemes defined in this document MUST NOT be used in TLS 1.2 or below.” And “A peer that receives ServerKeyExchange or CertificateVerify message in a TLS 1.2 or below connection”
>
>
Does this address it?

https://github.com/tlswg/tls-mldsa/pull/13



> -------------
>
> I realize that there are many considerations that need to be put into
> place in the “Security Considerations” and it has been left as a TODO.
> There’s probably some worth in taking some of the info in 8446 appendix C,
> D, and E, and discussing them in terms of using PQC for authentication vs
> non-PQC. As well as the decision to NOT allow the hash-ml-dsa variants and
> other such security considerations like what’s discussed in FIPS 204
> section 3
>

Agreed. There is some early discussion here already.
https://github.com/tlswg/tls-mldsa/pull/9

Best,

 Bas


>
>
> Thank you,
>
>
>
> Ryan Appel
>
>
>
>
>
>
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