[TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSLKEYLOGFILE Format for TLS

David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org> Fri, 07 February 2025 18:56 UTC

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From: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Date: Fri, 07 Feb 2025 13:56:13 -0500
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Subject: [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSLKEYLOGFILE Format for TLS
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On Fri, Feb 7, 2025 at 1:55 PM David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org> wrote:

> Accepting both labels gets super messy because then we have to make a
> bunch of decisions like whether you output both labels on the logging side.
>
> But we can just do a bit of research here:
> - In IETF land, EARLY_EXPORTER_MASTER_SECRET dates to the start of the
> I-D, but...
> - The shorter EXPORTER_SECRET name for the non-early secret dates to the
> earliest proposals for TLS 1.3 here:
> https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1287711
> - BoringSSL does not output this label
> - OpenSSL does not output this label
>

Correction: OpenSSL outputs this label but uses EARLY_EXPORTER_SECRET. Had
the wrong grep. :-)


> - NSS outputs this label but uses EARLY_EXPORTER_SECRET
> - Wireshark consumes this label but uses EARLY_EXPORTER_SECRET
>
> So I think EARLY_EXPORTER_MASTER_SECRET was just a typo and should always
> have been EARLY_EXPORTER_SECRET. Unless there's any evidence that someone
> actually relies on the EARLY_EXPORTER_MASTER_SECRET label (very, very
> unlikely given both the history of early exporters and the history of this
> SSLKEYLOGFILE integration), I think the answer is clear: No, we should not
> accept both labels. We should simply fix it to say EARLY_EXPORTER_SECRET
> and move on.
>
> David
>
> On Fri, Feb 7, 2025 at 1:33 PM Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:
>
>> The question is really "should we accept both names?"
>>
>>