Re: [TLS] ECH & HPKE versions as an example of too much githubbery

Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> Wed, 28 October 2020 00:32 UTC

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From: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>
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Date: Tue, 27 Oct 2020 20:32:33 -0400
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To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ECH & HPKE versions as an example of too much githubbery
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Stephen,

Given that there appears to be emerging consensus around the "issue discussion mode with email summaries sounds" presented in Chris' email from just last week can we let that settle?

We can certainly get a summary together - granted there have been interim meetings with published minutes [0][1].

We could also adopt an approach similar to the QUIC WG where they would declare a particular draft version one that they would run interop on. We would need to decide on the process of declaring what that version was as well as moving to the next version.

spt

[0] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/minutes-interim-2020-tls-02-202009031000/
[1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/minutes-interim-2020-tls-03-202009210800/

> On Oct 27, 2020, at 16:31, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:
> 
> 
> Hiya,
> 
> The latest ECH draft from Oct 16 says "ECH uses draft-05 of
> HPKE for public key encryption."
> 
> The latest HPKE draft (-06) from Oct 23 has a few minor
> incompatible changes (for good but relatively trivial
> reasons).
> 
> So for interop ECH apparently requires use of an outdated
> I-D, despite the one week difference in publishing and
> a common co-author.
> 
> It seems a bit mad that all that githubbery results in
> such a lack of co-ordination in two closely related
> specs.
> 
> Anyway, I can manage to handle both HPKE-05 and
> HPKE-06 but this seems like yet another case where
> there is too much githubbery going on with the result
> that two closely linked drafts with a common co-author
> end up out of whack despite being issued within a week
> of one another.
> 
> That and the velocity of discussion and changes on
> github are a major disincentive (for me) for implementing
> ECH. I simply do not have the cycles to keep up with it
> as it has been happening these last months. If that were
> the goal of the authors and those endlessly commenting on
> github (and I do not believe it is), then they would be
> close to reaching that goal.
> 
> Can we not please freeze this stuff for at least long
> enough to get implementations done and somewhat tested?
> 
> Frankly, I expect my plea here to be more or less ignored
> just as my previous entreaties were. I decided to send
> it anyway on the basis that the perhaps what seems like
> an obvious failure of the current approach (ECH can't
> interop unless you use an outdated I-D for HPKE) might
> show that all this apparent high velocity discussion on
> github is not as effetcive as claimed (in at least this
> case).
> 
> Thanks,
> Stephen.
> 
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