[TLS] Re: [EXT] Re: [Last-Call] <draft-ietf-tls-mldsa-03.txt> (Use of ML-DSA in TLS 1.3) to Informational RFC

Brian E Carpenter <brian.e.carpenter@gmail.com> Tue, 26 May 2026 20:34 UTC

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Date: Wed, 27 May 2026 08:34:20 +1200
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To: "Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL" <uri@ll.mit.edu>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: [TLS] Re: [EXT] Re: [Last-Call] <draft-ietf-tls-mldsa-03.txt> (Use of ML-DSA in TLS 1.3) to Informational RFC
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On 27-May-26 03:22, Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL wrote:
> 
>  >> That depends on relative difficulty of breaking algorithms. If quantum
>  >> attack against first algorithm is much cheaper than attacking the second
>  >> algorithm, then the second algorithm is the bottleneck and adding the
>  >> first to composite does not improve security.
>  >
>  > Last time I checked, 1000+1 > 1000, which is all I was asserting. If I’d
>  > asserted "breaking two algorithms is always *significantly* harder than
>  >  breaking one algorithm", I would have been wrong.
> 
> You keep ignoring or forgetting that the above “+1” is not free, so one has to evaluate the cost/trouble of adding that “1” against the benefits it’s going to add.

That's a different argument. I completely agree that the final decision about what algorithm(s) to implement or deploy needs such a cost/benefit analysis.

> 
> For example, nobody argues that if we super-encrypt AES ciphertext with , e.g., ARIA — we’ll increase the overall security. But, for reasons quite obvious, nobody seems willing to add that “+1” to the “1000” that AES already provided.

Fair enough. But I have been led to understand that hybrid algorithms are very significantly harder to break than either conventional or PQ algorithms, and only somewhat more expensive to deploy.

    Brian