Re: [TLS] sect571r1
Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> Mon, 20 July 2015 13:08 UTC
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From: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
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Date: Mon, 20 Jul 2015 15:08:29 +0200
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Subject: Re: [TLS] sect571r1
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On Wednesday 15 July 2015 22:42:54 Dave Garrett wrote: > On Wednesday, July 15, 2015 09:42:51 pm Dan Brown wrote: > > What about sect571k1, a Koblitz curve, aka NIST curve K-571? (By the way > > it has no unexplained constants...). Has it been removed already, or does > > the question also refer K-571 too? > Already dropped. That's obviously not irreversible, but it's unambiguously > in the virtually unused camp. The initial goal was to drop all largely > unused curves. > > This question is just about sect571r1, which is far closer to secp384r1 & > secp521r1 in terms of usage, though still notably less. If you want to > argue for going with sect571k1 and not sect571r1, I don't think the WG is > on-board with that. Even if we continued to allow it, I doubt much would > add support for it to be worthwhile. This is likely just an artefact of use of OpenSSL curve order, if K-571 was first, the servers would likely select it over B-571 more often > The scan I linked to found one; literally a single server on the entire > Internet, _not_ a single server in the Internet, a single server among Alexa top 1 million websites - the scan is checking only a set of popular _websites_, not even all popular services that use TLS, let alone the whole Internet > that actually supports sect571k1 for ECDHE. The stats also show > 1575 "support" it, so I'm not sure what's going on there specifically. (if > someone can explain this bit of those stats, please do) The "Supported PFS" section describes what the server selects if the client advertises default OpenSSL order of all defined curves. The "Prefer" lines, means that the ciphersuite selected by server by default uses this key exchange. IOW, if server supports FFDHE 2048 and ECDHE P-256 and prefers ECDHE, then the server will be counted in three lines: DH,2048bits ECDH,P-256,256bits Prefer ECDH,P-256,256bits The "Supported ECC curves" section describes what curves the server will use for ECDHE key exchange if its preferred one is not advertised by client (in most cases that means what happens if the client doesn't advertise P-256 curve). Then that curve is removed and the process repeated until the server picks a ciphersuite that doesn't use ECDHE or aborts connection. feel free to ask more questions about the scans if something is still unclear -- Regards, Hubert Kario Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team Web: www.cz.redhat.com Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purkyňova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic
- Re: [TLS] sect571r1 Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] sect571r1 Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] sect571r1 Tony Arcieri
- [TLS] sect571r1 Dave Garrett
- Re: [TLS] sect571r1 Benjamin Beurdouche
- Re: [TLS] sect571r1 Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL
- Re: [TLS] sect571r1 Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] sect571r1 Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] sect571r1 Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] sect571r1 Deirdre Connolly
- Re: [TLS] sect571r1 Adam Langley
- Re: [TLS] sect571r1 Tanja Lange
- Re: [TLS] sect571r1 Dave Garrett
- Re: [TLS] sect571r1 Dave Garrett
- Re: [TLS] sect571r1 Dan Brown
- Re: [TLS] sect571r1 Tony Arcieri
- Re: [TLS] sect571r1 Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL
- Re: [TLS] sect571r1 Dave Garrett
- Re: [TLS] sect571r1 Rob Stradling
- Re: [TLS] sect571r1 Rob Stradling
- Re: [TLS] sect571r1 Martin Thomson
- Re: [TLS] sect571r1 Brian Smith
- Re: [TLS] sect571r1 Tony Arcieri
- Re: [TLS] sect571r1 Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] sect571r1 Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL
- Re: [TLS] sect571r1 Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] sect571r1 Tony Arcieri
- [TLS] (selection criteria for crypto primitives) … Rene Struik
- Re: [TLS] (selection criteria for crypto primitiv… Tony Arcieri
- Re: [TLS] sect571r1 Dan Brown
- Re: [TLS] (selection criteria for crypto primitiv… Jeffrey Walton
- Re: [TLS] (selection criteria for crypto primitiv… Tony Arcieri
- Re: [TLS] sect571r1 Dave Garrett
- Re: [TLS] sect571r1 Dave Garrett
- Re: [TLS] sect571r1 Jeffrey Walton
- Re: [TLS] sect571r1 Tony Arcieri
- Re: [TLS] sect571r1 Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] sect571r1 Jeffrey Walton
- Re: [TLS] sect571r1 Jeffrey Walton
- Re: [TLS] sect571r1 Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] (selection criteria for crypto primitiv… Dave Garrett
- Re: [TLS] (selection criteria for crypto primitiv… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] sect571r1 Tony Arcieri
- Re: [TLS] sect571r1 Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL
- Re: [TLS] sect571r1 Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL
- Re: [TLS] sect571r1 Hubert Kario
- Re: [TLS] (selection criteria for crypto primitiv… Johannes Merkle
- Re: [TLS] (selection criteria for crypto primitiv… Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [TLS] (selection criteria for crypto primitiv… Dave Garrett
- Re: [TLS] (selection criteria for crypto primitiv… Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [TLS] (selection criteria for crypto primitiv… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] sect571r1 Sean Turner