Re: [TLS] Finished stuffing

Hugo Krawczyk <hugo@ee.technion.ac.il> Wed, 07 September 2016 23:02 UTC

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From: Hugo Krawczyk <hugo@ee.technion.ac.il>
Date: Wed, 7 Sep 2016 19:02:16 -0400
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To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
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Cc: Antoine Delignat-Lavaud <antoine@delignat-lavaud.fr>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Finished stuffing
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I don't  understand the proposal.
Are you proposing to eliminate resumption_context (RC) from All its current
uses and replace it with the hello_finished extension? Or is this to affect
only certain uses of RC? Which ones?

One important property of RC is that it serves as a binding with the
original context that generated a resumption PSK, in particular a binding
with the server's identity (certificate). This is not achieved by the
hello_finished extension, is it?

I also have a problem with names. "Resumption context" is very explicit
about providing, well, resumption context.
"Hello_Finished", in turn, means nothing.
Also, RC may better match the notion of "binder" hence more naturally
requiring collision resistance, while all Finished uses in TLS (1.3 and
before) have a MAC functionality (for which, say, 128 bits are good enough)
and it would be better not to abuse them for other uses.

Anyways, maybe this is just the result of my misunderstanding of the
proposal.

Hugo


On Wed, Sep 7, 2016 at 11:26 AM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:

>
>
> On Wed, Sep 7, 2016 at 8:25 AM, David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
> wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Sep 7, 2016 at 11:11 AM Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>>
>>> On Wed, Sep 7, 2016 at 6:54 AM, Antoine Delignat-Lavaud <
>>> antoine@delignat-lavaud.fr> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Regarding whether the placeholder zeros should be part of the
>>>> transcript for the stuffed finished, an argument against it is that it
>>>> violates the incremental nature of the session hash. If the hash stops
>>>> before the placeholder, it can be resumed with the computed finished;
>>>> otherwise, it must be rolled back.
>>>>
>>>
>>> This isn't a big deal for me (or I think any other implementor) either
>>> way, because of the actual way we compute the hash.
>>>
>>
>> To expand on that, because the final PRF hash is not known at the time we
>> send ClientHello, most implementations I've seen just buffer the full
>> transcript before this point.
>>
>> But one could also keep a rolling hash of all the supported PRFs (there's
>> all of two of them if you lose TLS 1.1 and below), so I think that's a good
>> argument for using the prefix rather than zeros. For implementations
>> keeping a buffer, I don't think it matters, so let's keep both strategies
>> happy.
>>
>
> This is certainly fine with me.
>
> -Ekr
>
>
>>
>> David
>>
>>
>>
>>> -Ekr
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> Best,
>>>>
>>>> Antoine
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Le 2016-09-07 05:49, Joseph Salowey a écrit :
>>>>
>>>>> Hi Folks,
>>>>>
>>>>> The chairs want to make sure this gets some proper review.   Please
>>>>> respond with comments by Friday so we can make some progress on this
>>>>> issue.
>>>>>
>>>>> Thanks,
>>>>>
>>>>> J&S
>>>>>
>>>>> On Tue, Sep 6, 2016 at 11:57 AM, David Benjamin
>>>>> <davidben@chromium.org> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> I think this is a good idea. It's kind of weird, but it avoids
>>>>>> giving the early Finished such a strange relationship with the
>>>>>> handshake transcript. Also a fan of doing away with multiple PSK
>>>>>> identities if we don't need it.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> As a bonus, this removes the need to route a "phase" parameter into
>>>>>> the traffic key calculation since we'll never derive more than one
>>>>>> epoch off of the same traffic secret. Combine that with the
>>>>>> two-ladder KeyUpdate and we no longer need any concatenation or
>>>>>> other label-munging at all. Simply use labels "key" and "iv" and the
>>>>>> record-layer just exposes a single UseTrafficSecret function which
>>>>>> saves the traffic secret (for KeyUpdate), derives the traffic keys,
>>>>>> and engages the new AEAD in one swoop without mucking about with
>>>>>> phases, traffic directions, whether we are client or server, etc.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> David
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 6:19 PM Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I should also mention that this makes the implementation a fair bit
>>>>>> simpler because:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 1. You can make all the decisions on the server side immediately
>>>>>> upon receiving the ClientHello
>>>>>> without waiting for Finished.
>>>>>> 2. You don't need to derive early handshake traffic keys.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> >From an implementor's perspective, this outweighs the messing around
>>>>>> with the ClientHello buffer.
>>>>>> -Ekr
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 3:04 PM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Folks,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I have just posted a WIP PR for what I'm calling "Finished Stuffing"
>>>>>>
>>>>>> https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/615 [1]
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I would welcome comments on this direction and whether I am missing
>>>>>> anything important.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> OVERVIEW
>>>>>> This PR follows on a bunch of discussions we've had about the
>>>>>> redundancy
>>>>>> of Finished and resumption_ctx. This PR makes the following changes:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> - Replace the 0-RTT Finished with an extension you send in the
>>>>>> ClientHello *whenever* you do PSK.
>>>>>> - Get rid of resumption context (because it is now replaced by
>>>>>> the ClientHello.hello_finished.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> RATIONALE
>>>>>> The reasoning for this change is:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> - With ordinary PSK you don't get any assurance that the other side
>>>>>> knows the PSK.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> - With 0-RTT you get some (subject to the usual anti-replay
>>>>>> guarantees) via the Finished message.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> - If we were to include the 0-RTT Finished message in the handshake
>>>>>> transcript, then we wouldn't need the resumption context because
>>>>>> the transcript would transitively include the PSK via the
>>>>>> Finished.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> So the natural thing to do would be to always send 0-RTT Finished
>>>>>> but unfortunately:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 1. You can't just send the 0-RTT Finished whenever you do PSK
>>>>>> because
>>>>>> that causes potential compat problems with mixed 1.3/1.2 networks
>>>>>> (the same ones we have with 0-RTT, but at least that's opt-in).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 2. You also can't send the 0-RTT Finished with PSK because you can
>>>>>> currently offer multiple PSK identities.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The on-list discussion has suggested we could relax condition #2 and
>>>>>> only have one identity. And we can fix condition #1 by stuffing the
>>>>>> Finished in an extension (with some hacks to make this easier). This
>>>>>> PR enacts that.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> FAQS
>>>>>> - What gets included in the handshake transcript?
>>>>>> The whole ClientHello including the computed hello_finished
>>>>>> extension.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> - Isn't this a hassle to implement?
>>>>>> It turns out not to be. The basic reason is that at the point
>>>>>> where
>>>>>> the client sends the ClientHello and the server processes, it
>>>>>> doesn't
>>>>>> yet know which Hash will be chosen for HKDF and so NSS (and I
>>>>>> believe
>>>>>> other stacks) buffers the ClientHello in plaintext, so hashing
>>>>>> only
>>>>>> part of it is easy. I've done it in NSS and this part is quite
>>>>>> easy.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> POTENTIAL VARIATIONS/TODOs
>>>>>> There are a number of possible variations we might want to look at:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 1. Moving obfuscated_ticket_age to its own extension (out of
>>>>>> early_data_indication). This provides additional anti-replay
>>>>>> for the CH at the 0.5RTT sending point. I believe we should
>>>>>> make this change.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 2. Tweaking the data to be hashed to just hash the ClientHello
>>>>>> prefix without the 0-filled verify_data. This is not
>>>>>> significantly
>>>>>> harder or easier to implement and basically depends on whether
>>>>>> you prefer the invariant of "always hash complete messages" or
>>>>>> "always hash valid pieces of transcript". See above for notes
>>>>>> on buffering.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 3. Allow multiple PSKs. Technically you could make this design
>>>>>> work with >1 PSK but stuffing multiple verify_data values in
>>>>>> the ClientHello. E.g,,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> opaque FinishedValue<0..255>;
>>>>>>
>>>>>> struct {
>>>>>> FinishedValue finisheds<0..2^16-1>;
>>>>>> } HelloFinished;
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Based on the list discussion, it seems like nobody wants >1 PSK,
>>>>>> so I think one is simpler; I just wanted to note that these
>>>>>> changes weren't totally coupled.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 4. External context values. Several people have pointed out that it
>>>>>> might be convenient to have an external context value hashed
>>>>>> into the transcript. One way to do this would be to include
>>>>>> it under the Finished. That's not difficult if people want to,
>>>>>> with the default being empty.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 5. Hugo brought up on the list that we need to make very clear that
>>>>>> the "hello_finished" is being used to bind the handshakes and
>>>>>> that it depends on collision resistance. I have not forgotten
>>>>>> this
>>>>>> and text on that point would be appreciated.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Comments welcome.
>>>>>> -Ekr
>>>>>>
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> TLS mailing list
>>>>>> TLS@ietf.org
>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls [2]
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>  TLS mailing list
>>>>>  TLS@ietf.org
>>>>>  https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls [2]
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Links:
>>>>> ------
>>>>> [1] https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/615
>>>>> [2] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
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>>>>> TLS@ietf.org
>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>>>>
>>>>
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