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Re: [TLS] OPTLS: Signature-less TLS 1.3

Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com> Mon, 03 November 2014 16:53 UTC

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Date: Mon, 03 Nov 2014 10:53:29 -0600
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From: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
To: Hugo Krawczyk <hugo@ee.technion.ac.il>
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Cc: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>, Hoeteck Wee <hoeteck@alum.mit.edu>
Subject: Re: [TLS] OPTLS: Signature-less TLS 1.3
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On Sun, Nov 2, 2014 at 4:28 PM, Hugo Krawczyk <hugo@ee.technion.ac.il> wrote:
> The issues regarding group matching (and mis-matching) raised here and
> discussed
> in other messages are indeed very important.  [...]

More reason to use DANE...  With DANE the client could find out what
groups/curves the server supports before sending the first message.

Again, AUTH_DH/mech_dh worked that way.  The client could find the
service's pubkey and group in the publickey name services database.
There was no question of in-band negotiation.  The protocol was
effectively 0rt to get started to send data, 1rt to get key
confirmation.  But it long predated DNSSEC, and has been obsolete for
a long time, though mostly for lack of being updated to use DNSSEC and
modern crypto.

Nico
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