Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 : small fragments attack
Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org> Sat, 30 December 2017 05:43 UTC
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From: Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
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Date: Sat, 30 Dec 2017 00:42:23 -0500
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 : small fragments attack
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> On Dec 30, 2017, at 12:38 AM, Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> wrote: > > I think your idea in general is a good one, standards should include sanity > limits on what you should and shouldn't accept (I've managed to cause crashes > and reboots and whatnot on different servers by sending valid but unexpected > data during development, SSH makes this particularly easy), but in cases like > this it's hard to determine at which point you should and shouldn't accept the > traffic. Excessive padding aside, the traffic described could be largely normal, for example an SSL-encrypted channel carrying user keystrokes... -- Viktor.
- [TLS] TLS 1.3 : small fragments attack Jitendra Lulla
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 : small fragments attack Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 : small fragments attack Jitendra Lulla
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 : small fragments attack Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 : small fragments attack Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 : small fragments attack Yoav Nir