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Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3

Achim Kraus <achimkraus@gmx.net> Wed, 30 September 2020 05:21 UTC

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From: Achim Kraus <achimkraus@gmx.net>
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Date: Wed, 30 Sep 2020 07:21:45 +0200
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Subject: Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3
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Hi list,

exchanging arguments for N or Y again seems for me to be in vain.

Therefore my proposal to add the Y-period. For me that documents more
the fact, that the security trade off between security and resources is
changing over time. And so will the implementations and deployments.

best regards
Achim Kraus

Am 30.09.20 um 02:48 schrieb Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL:
> Because PSK is one of the affordable and reliable quantum-resistant key exchanges that work *today*? And done environments do not wish to do any EC operations.
>
> Yes, key management issues are real. Those who need it, understand the implications.
>
> Regards,
> Uri
>
>> On Sep 29, 2020, at 20:30, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> On Tue, Sep 29, 2020 at 12:49 PM Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL
>> <uri@ll.mit.edu> wrote:
>>>
>>> I share Achim's concerns.
>>>
>>> But I believe the explanations will turn out mostly useless in the real world, as the "lawyers" of the industry are guaranteed to steer away from something "not recommended".
>>>
>>> In one word: bad.
>>
>> Why is PSK so necessary? There are very few devices that can't handle
>> the occasional ECC operation.  The key management and forward secrecy
>> issues with TLS-PSK are real. Steering applications that can afford
>> the CPU away from PSK and toward hybrid modes is a good thing and why
>> this registry exists imho.
>>
>>
>> --
>> Astra mortemque praestare gradatim
>>
>> _______________________________________________
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>> TLS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls

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