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Re: [TLS] A closer look at ROBOT, BB Attacks, timing attacks in general, and what we can do in TLS

Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com> Fri, 15 December 2017 19:25 UTC

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From: Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>
To: Tim Hollebeek <tim.hollebeek@digicert.com>, Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
CC: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] A closer look at ROBOT, BB Attacks, timing attacks in general, and what we can do in TLS
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Date: Fri, 15 Dec 2017 19:25:20 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] A closer look at ROBOT, BB Attacks, timing attacks in general, and what we can do in TLS
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> Ideally, you'd want certificates to be able to have two signatures during
> the transition period, in order to support clients who have transitioned and
> those who have not.

> Hosting multiple certificates and switching based on the client is feasible,
> but requires some technical wizardry and isn't possible in all situations.

For my understanding, why is the former (double-signed certs, where either signature is trusted) better than the latter (multiple certs with different algorithms)?
The latter is currently supported by some TLS servers.

Cheers,

Andrei

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