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Re: [TLS] Security review of TLS1.3 0-RTT

Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com> Wed, 03 May 2017 18:31 UTC

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Date: Wed, 03 May 2017 13:29:56 -0500
From: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
To: TLS WG <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Security review of TLS1.3 0-RTT
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On Wed, May 03, 2017 at 12:10:12PM -0400, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
> > On May 3, 2017, at 12:01 PM, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:
> > The protocol design should avoid setting traps for the unwary.
> 
> No, that responsibility falls on libraries.  STEKs are not a trap for the
> unweary.  Libraries that support static session tickets by default can be
> viewed as such a trap.  So the onus to fix this is on us (OpenSSL team)
> not the TLS protocol.

A big +1 to this.

I think it would terrible if we couldn't have resumption at all because
one common implementation mishandles old key deletion.

Nico
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