Re: [TLS] Privacy considerations - identity hiding from eavesdropping in (D)TLS

Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> Mon, 24 August 2015 21:33 UTC

Return-Path: <paul@nohats.ca>
X-Original-To: tls@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: tls@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B1EA21A870C for <tls@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 24 Aug 2015 14:33:26 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.01
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.01 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, T_RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.01] autolearn=ham
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 6o29LnHVpLpT for <tls@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 24 Aug 2015 14:33:24 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mx.nohats.ca (mx.nohats.ca [IPv6:2a03:6000:1004:1::68]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 458231A854C for <TLS@ietf.org>; Mon, 24 Aug 2015 14:33:24 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from localhost (localhost [IPv6:::1]) by mx.nohats.ca (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3n0RX22zKGz21d; Mon, 24 Aug 2015 23:33:22 +0200 (CEST)
Authentication-Results: mx.nohats.ca; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=nohats.ca header.i=@nohats.ca header.b=DDPD9x0f
X-OPENPGPKEY: Message passed unmodified
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at mx.nohats.ca
Received: from mx.nohats.ca ([IPv6:::1]) by localhost (mx.nohats.ca [IPv6:::1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id D8e0UEVwwq4Y; Mon, 24 Aug 2015 23:33:20 +0200 (CEST)
Received: from bofh.nohats.ca (206-248-139-105.dsl.teksavvy.com [206.248.139.105]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mx.nohats.ca (Postfix) with ESMTPS; Mon, 24 Aug 2015 23:33:20 +0200 (CEST)
Received: from bofh.nohats.ca (bofh.nohats.ca [127.0.0.1]) by bofh.nohats.ca (Postfix) with ESMTP id 67A798009F; Mon, 24 Aug 2015 17:33:19 -0400 (EDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=nohats.ca; s=default; t=1440451999; bh=EhLKb20n94HS6kFqcW2fnDpyMZW2o4bnsSNmhv91Y2M=; h=Date:From:To:cc:Subject:In-Reply-To:References; b=DDPD9x0fpB+K69k9uRfgLPJDCp+Z4g2vcZ2waAVBzePn6+M6OROCdOQ2QyJWBEXyj nEz0eGYntnV5iLitnDHU8OSG+ZzRYiPj3lp/mE4QFHDGp3cLNFrutMk0pD/lOw666U aOynaKcS9gj+/GYVRWp29gFngOwtVRNZGH/F36Is=
Received: from localhost (paul@localhost) by bofh.nohats.ca (8.15.2/8.15.2/Submit) with ESMTP id t7OLXIPG002396; Mon, 24 Aug 2015 17:33:19 -0400
X-Authentication-Warning: bofh.nohats.ca: paul owned process doing -bs
Date: Mon, 24 Aug 2015 17:33:18 -0400 (EDT)
From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
In-Reply-To: <CABcZeBNP8SZeWWVj4_fGxZm-SvYG-cmtQoJ1xBaLLWsLKsNc4Q@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <alpine.LFD.2.20.1508241730590.31517@bofh.nohats.ca>
References: <CAL6x8mchyh2Qpqcd5Rv-rXgZ+1_CAbV7vkib+-yU4DEDFx82Yg@mail.gmail.com> <CABcZeBNP8SZeWWVj4_fGxZm-SvYG-cmtQoJ1xBaLLWsLKsNc4Q@mail.gmail.com>
User-Agent: Alpine 2.20 (LFD 67 2015-01-07)
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset=US-ASCII
Archived-At: <http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/leEv8C5M8IwGoZKqqTNV-8ixyCQ>
Cc: "tls@ietf.org" <TLS@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Privacy considerations - identity hiding from eavesdropping in (D)TLS
X-BeenThere: tls@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
List-Id: "This is the mailing list for the Transport Layer Security working group of the IETF." <tls.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/tls>, <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/tls/>
List-Post: <mailto:tls@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls>, <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 24 Aug 2015 21:33:26 -0000

On Mon, 24 Aug 2015, Eric Rescorla wrote:

> TLS 1.3 encrypts both the client's and server's certificates already.
> The server's certificate is secure only against passive attack.

Not having read the TLS 1.3 draft, in IKE parties can send a hash of the
CAs they trust, so unless you receive a hash of a known CA to you, you
can withold your own certificate from being sent.

Is a similar mechanism not planned for TLS 1.3?

Paul