Re: [TLS] ban more old crap

Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org> Sat, 25 July 2015 05:46 UTC

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Date: Sat, 25 Jul 2015 05:46:22 +0000
From: Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
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References: <201507221610.27729.davemgarrett@gmail.com> <201507241257.43115.davemgarrett@gmail.com> <2164745.i4WjRk8WKj@pintsize.usersys.redhat.com> <201507241403.14071.davemgarrett@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ban more old crap
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On Fri, Jul 24, 2015 at 02:03:13PM -0400, Dave Garrett wrote:

> > and how a server can tell that the client is TLS1.3 only and not TLS1.0-up-to-
> > TLS1.3?
> 
> TLS 1.0-1.3 shouldn't be offering export ciphers any more than TLS 1.3
> only. A TLS 1.0-1.2 client, or at least one offering that, is what it
> would not complain about.

We can probably put the "export" ciphersuite issue out of its
misery, already in email, these are no longer seen on the public
Internet.  The latest official versions of all supported Postfix
releases now turn off "export" ciphers (and also single-DES) by
default.  We've also by default turned off SSLv2 and SSLv3 (neither
are needed for SMTP interoperability).

What we've cannot yet turn off is RC4.  That's still sufficiently
widely used that disabling RC4 would result in excessive cleartext
fallback and even in some cases failure to deliver email.

So for opportunistic TLS (in SMTP) we've raised the bar to exclude
deprecated TLS features that we can (finally) easily do without.

I hope, that by ~2017, RC4 will no longer be required either, and
we'll be able to disable RC4 in Postfix at that time.

If I recall correctly, the upcoming OpenSSL 1.1.0 release will by
default also compile with no "export" ciphers, SSLv2 or SSLv3
support.

We're starting to leave some of the older cruft behind.  Let's get
Chacha20 widely deployed (for systems without hardware AES), and
the passage of time lead to more RC4-only systems being replaced,
and in the not too distant future, even opportunistic TLS clients
should be able to forgo RC4, but we're not quite there yet today.

-- 
	Viktor.