Re: [TLS] Privacy considerations - identity hiding from eavesdropping in (D)TLS

Badra <badra@isima.fr> Mon, 24 August 2015 22:19 UTC

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Date: Tue, 25 Aug 2015 02:19:09 +0400
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From: Badra <badra@isima.fr>
To: "Viktor S. Wold Eide" <viktor.s.wold.eide@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Privacy considerations - identity hiding from eavesdropping in (D)TLS
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Hi,

Another solution was approved for publication as experimental by IESG in
2009 but I declined to process with Pasi Eronen way (previous WG co-Chair)
of publishing the document.

It is available at
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hajjeh-tls-identity-protection-09 and it
works for TLS and DTLS

Best regards, Mohamad

On Tue, Aug 25, 2015 at 12:56 AM, Viktor S. Wold Eide <
viktor.s.wold.eide@gmail.com>; wrote:

> Hi,
>
> I am looking for a way to achieve identity hiding for DTLS 1.2, which also
> hopefully can be used in (D)TLS 1.3, when available.
>
> From what I understand, for (D)TLS 1.2 it would be possible to perform an
> anonymous unencrypted handshake and then to renegotiate the connection with
> authentication within the encrypted channel, e.g., according to the expired
> draft [1]. From the latest TLS 1.3 draft [2] it appears that renegotiation
> will be removed in the upcoming 1.3 version.
>
> What is likely to be the recommended way to achieve identity hiding for
> (D)TLS 1.3, if any?
>
> [1] Transport Layer Security (TLS) Encrypted Handshake Extension,
> draft-ray-tls-encrypted-handshake-00, expired in 2012
> [2] The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3,
> draft-ietf-tls-tls13-07
>
>
> Best regards
> Viktor S. Wold Eide
>
>
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