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Re: [TLS] analysis of wider impact of TLS1.3 replayabe data

"Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com> Mon, 14 March 2016 19:26 UTC

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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Ryan Hamilton <rch@google.com>, Geoffrey Keating <geoffk@geoffk.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] analysis of wider impact of TLS1.3 replayabe data
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Date: Mon, 14 Mar 2016 19:25:57 +0000
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Cc: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] analysis of wider impact of TLS1.3 replayabe data
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> It's worth keeping in mind this recent paper about Replay attacks against HTTPS. TL;DR: Attackers can already force a browser to replay requests basically at will. ​As a result, it's not clear that 0-RTT replay makes this situation worse.

TLS is more than just browsers, which is what started this thread I think

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