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Re: [TLS] Avoiding first use of RI in ClientHello

Dr Stephen Henson <lists@drh-consultancy.demon.co.uk> Wed, 25 November 2009 22:53 UTC

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Date: Wed, 25 Nov 2009 22:53:55 +0000
From: Dr Stephen Henson <lists@drh-consultancy.demon.co.uk>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Avoiding first use of RI in ClientHello
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Eric Rescorla wrote:
> Folks,
> 
> I wanted to try to resolve what I see as the major technical concern
> people have about draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation-00, namely that the
> client cannot offer secure renegotiation and be sure that it won't
> cause a connection failure with a downrev (extension noncompliant)
> server.
> 
[details snipped]

I like it! This addresses all my concerns.

Steve.
-- 
Dr Stephen N. Henson.
Core developer of the   OpenSSL project: http://www.openssl.org/
Freelance consultant see: http://www.drh-consultancy.co.uk/
Email: shenson@drh-consultancy.co.uk, PGP key: via homepage.

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