Re: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI extension in China
Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com> Tue, 11 August 2020 08:39 UTC
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From: Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 11 Aug 2020 01:38:50 -0700
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To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
Cc: Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net>,
Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net>, "TLS@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI extension in China
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On Tue, Aug 11, 2020 at 12:14 AM Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> wrote: > > As Yuri Totrov, a.k.a the shadow director of personnel at the CIA, showed: > > https://mindmatters.ai/2018/11/how-the-kgb-found-cia-agents/ > > the only way to hide A as B is if you become B. Which means you can't be A > any more. I'm confused. That seems to be a bunch of boilerplate surrounding a Salon article from 2015: https://www.salon.com/2015/09/26/how_to_explain_the_kgbs_amazing_success_identifying_cia_agents_in_the_field/ It also contains references to supplementary material, like whether Intelligent Design can be linked to information theory: https://mindmatters.ai/2018/10/does-information-theory-support-design-in-nature/ I am not sure this issue is on topic for this list. > There was a paper that looked a traffic morphing published a year > or two ago that came to the same conclusion, to look like you're Skype or a > SIP VoIP call you need to actually be Skype or a SIP VoIP call. > You could link it, perhaps. thanks, Rob
- [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI extensio… onoketa
- Re: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI exte… Christian Huitema
- Re: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI exte… David Fifield
- Re: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI exte… David Fifield
- Re: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI exte… Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL
- Re: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI exte… Dmitry Belyavsky
- Re: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI exte… Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI exte… Christian Huitema
- Re: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI exte… Christopher Wood
- Re: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI exte… David Fifield
- Re: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI exte… Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI exte… Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI exte… Christian Huitema
- Re: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI exte… Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI exte… Rob Sayre
- Re: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI exte… Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI exte… Rob Sayre
- Re: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI exte… Christian Huitema
- Re: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI exte… Rob Sayre
- Re: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI exte… Christian Huitema
- Re: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI exte… Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI exte… Rob Sayre
- Re: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI exte… David Fifield
- Re: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI exte… Nick Sullivan
- Re: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI exte… David Fifield
- Re: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI exte… Rob Sayre
- Re: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI exte… Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI exte… Rob Sayre
- Re: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI exte… Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI exte… Rob Sayre
- Re: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI exte… David Fifield
- Re: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI exte… David Fifield
- Re: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI exte… Carrick Bartle
- Re: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI exte… David Fifield