From nobody Wed Sep 23 02:50:49 2020 Return-Path: X-Original-To: tls@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: tls@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9DBBA3A0EF4; Wed, 23 Sep 2020 02:50:47 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -2.097 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.097 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id LQsWfHpF6cbV; Wed, 23 Sep 2020 02:50:45 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail-io1-xd35.google.com (mail-io1-xd35.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::d35]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 925243A0EAF; Wed, 23 Sep 2020 02:50:45 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-io1-xd35.google.com with SMTP id u6so22939313iow.9; Wed, 23 Sep 2020 02:50:45 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=u2gb2tos923sX4KUookxjYq5xOoroUQ2RvhXedcSo4g=; b=HvW99eLlrVCgdDT623etMD9JhRxyih3wuFdk7/AG2fClKutw/dXekI2OophqKzw5PS Y64NC6NK/vmgcjnDIwUGXuP+0HHTlDvntr7Hp0X2Fl0yS2K0q0SMeG2wqO1ZBxycywsB iPQPm2hpv9DUR1GR3Q+BZRON7ZstiN2WIwvw+9kMXBXR9KHmVeX+k+JDzCgh81I6kZUY Rbgp4vx2cicClvSaYQ6o8MIO0ciihZKjChLBdWpWbAip7+OoYNeECeFsoENWPWXA9zv1 uHPdqf7i+K9IdrU5MFc1OX6wU4WoowAj4ibp6veQk+o6T7glh1NJZf4mBPCVOS+o4Bfp FxHw== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=u2gb2tos923sX4KUookxjYq5xOoroUQ2RvhXedcSo4g=; b=sDpjcKL5/gICdKLQ75SKfiqzEPu1HvsG3VdkRhg9I/1XOyw7MTdCwQSCp76AgZUJbs PRGT5f3HQ3jje+E1uSvJBbz6j5VV66vIeWrF8MJE2Fuu5ryiUbyoGgnLVP2PaAxt5RUs FKi+W93A/FGWU7Msjtn3JTE4zAl1yo/ayg3aN9K7R1Usq9VqBcn/aGhSaFHSqa0hJMgp 0RYbbLnIW/lh4AvWTYnbu85gF4V4FI8/MyS/i4xM2J1IzjG11Vw6zn9cVYyyiGfWUndw XywcrhfjT8ohvuOIUoqm8rny5i+8S1oHxJXTT0ek0gh4ByFxs95ihgcxtav11WyTCRqJ Ot3g== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM530vXq1yA2D8BSmsODQqQcW1skQuDVXL9cfzkPTQVWRcApCvCpP/ 1FIFJaOvnpUmJWYMwudByQ4bLQ273+MYd7AWFbg= X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJwKdtcfVfB7gbB6Vf4YDjR0N2oWUYhNC5qRMCa8EIZ2ZJurcL9Mw3QF4cS7vApVVsGe7Tu1/xUwGApZxwtLrcA= X-Received: by 2002:a6b:c8d6:: with SMTP id y205mr6623313iof.177.1600854644577; Wed, 23 Sep 2020 02:50:44 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <21BA8D05-DD83-44DE-81B9-457692484CAD@cisco.com> <053b286e-4780-1818-a79d-71b9c967bbd2@sandelman.ca> <20200911114054.184988dc@totoro.tlrmx.org> In-Reply-To: From: tirumal reddy Date: Wed, 23 Sep 2020 15:20:32 +0530 Message-ID: To: Ben Schwartz Cc: Eliot Lear , opsawg , "" Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="0000000000006d5a9305aff804e7" Archived-At: Subject: Re: [TLS] [OPSAWG] CALL FOR ADOPTION: draft-reddy-opsawg-mud-tls X-BeenThere: tls@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: "This is the mailing list for the Transport Layer Security working group of the IETF." List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 23 Sep 2020 09:50:48 -0000 --0000000000006d5a9305aff804e7 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Hi Ben, Please see inline On Tue, 22 Sep 2020 at 20:45, Ben Schwartz wrote: > I'm not able to understand the new text in Section 6. Are you saying tha= t > clients MUST include all the listed extensions/features, but MAY also > include extensions/features not listed in the MUD profile? So the MUD > profile only acts as a "minimum" set of features? > Section 6 discusses the firewall behaviour when it sees a) known extensions/features in a TLS session but not specified in the MUD profile b) unknown extensions/features in a TLS session either specified or not specified in the MUD profile c) updated MUD profile specifying extensions/features not supported by the firewall. If the client supports new features/extensions but not yet added in the YANG module, it can be updated using expert review or specification required registration procedure, discussed in https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8126. Cheers, -Tiru > > On Tue, Sep 22, 2020 at 7:34 AM tirumal reddy wrote: > >> On Sun, 20 Sep 2020 at 14:05, Eliot Lear wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> > On 11 Sep 2020, at 12:40, Nick Lamb wrote: >>> > >>> > On Fri, 11 Sep 2020 12:32:03 +0530 >>> > tirumal reddy wrote: >>> > >>> >> The MUD URL is encrypted and shared only with the authorized >>> >> components in the network. An attacker cannot read the MUD URL and >>> >> identify the IoT device. Otherwise, it provides the attacker with >>> >> guidance on what vulnerabilities may be present on the IoT device. >>> > >>> > RFC 8520 envisions that the MUD URL is broadcast as a DHCP option and >>> > over LLDP without - so far as I was able to see - any mechanism by >>> which >>> > it should be meaningfully "encrypted" as to prevent an attacker on yo= ur >>> > network from reading it. >>> >>> That=E2=80=99s a bit of an overstatement. RFC 8520 specifies a compone= nt >>> architecture. It names three ways of emitting a URL (DHCP, LLDP, 802.1= X w/ >>> certificate). Two other mechanisms have already been developed (QR cod= e, >>> Device Provisioning Protocol), and a 3rd new method is on the way for >>> cellular devices. >>> >>> I would not universally claim that a MUD URL is secret but neither woul= d >>> I claim it is not. The management tooling will know which is which, as >>> will the manufacturer, and can make decisions accordingly. >>> >>> This having been said, it seems to me we are off on the wrong foot >>> here. The serious argument that needs to be addressed is Ben=E2=80=99s= and EKR's. >>> We have to be careful about ossification. >>> >> >> In order to address the comments on ossification, we added a new section >> 6 to explain the rules to processing the MUD (D)TLS rules to handle unkn= own >> TLS parameters and updated Section 10 to enable faster update to the YAN= G >> module. Please see >> https://github.com/tireddy2/MUD-TLS-profile/blob/master/draft-reddy-opsa= wg-mud-tls-06.txt >> >> -Tiru >> _______________________________________________ >> TLS mailing list >> TLS@ietf.org >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls >> > --0000000000006d5a9305aff804e7 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Hi Ben,

Please see inline=C2= =A0

On Tue, 22 Sep 2020 at 20:45, Ben = Schwartz <bemasc@= google.com> wrote:
I'm not able to u= nderstand the new text in Section 6.=C2=A0 Are you saying that clients MUST= include all the listed extensions/features, but=C2=A0MAY also include exte= nsions/features not listed in the MUD profile?=C2=A0 So the MUD profile onl= y acts as a "minimum" set of features?
Section 6 discusses the firewall behaviour when it sees a) know= n extensions/features in a TLS session but not specified in the MUD profile= b) unknown extensions/features in a TLS session either specified or not sp= ecified in the MUD profile c) updated MUD profile specifying=20 extensions/features=C2=A0 not supported by the firewall.

=
If the client supports new features/extensions but not yet added= in the YANG module, it can be updated using expert review or specification= required registration procedure, discussed in https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8126.=C2=A0


On Tue, Sep 22, 2020 at 7= :34 AM tirumal reddy <kondtir@gmail.com> wrote:
On Sun, 20 Sep 2020 at 14:05, E= liot Lear <lear@cisc= o.com> wrote:


> On 11 Sep 2020, at 12:40, Nick Lamb <njl@tlrmx.org> wrote:
>
> On Fri, 11 Sep 2020 12:32:03 +0530
> tirumal reddy <kondtir@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> The MUD URL is encrypted and shared only with the authorized
>> components in the network. An=C2=A0 attacker cannot read the MUD U= RL and
>> identify the IoT device. Otherwise, it provides the attacker with<= br> >> guidance on what vulnerabilities may be present on the IoT device.=
>
> RFC 8520 envisions that the MUD URL is broadcast as a DHCP option and<= br> > over LLDP without - so far as I was able to see - any mechanism by whi= ch
> it should be meaningfully "encrypted" as to prevent an attac= ker on your
> network from reading it.

That=E2=80=99s a bit of an overstatement.=C2=A0 RFC 8520 specifies a compon= ent architecture.=C2=A0 It names three ways of emitting a URL (DHCP, LLDP, = 802.1X w/ certificate).=C2=A0 Two other mechanisms have already been develo= ped (QR code, Device Provisioning Protocol), and a 3rd new method is on the= way for cellular devices.

I would not universally claim that a MUD URL is secret but neither would I = claim it is not.=C2=A0 The management tooling will know which is which, as = will the manufacturer, and can make decisions accordingly.

This having been said, it seems to me we are off on the wrong foot here.=C2= =A0 The serious argument that needs to be addressed is Ben=E2=80=99s and EK= R's.=C2=A0 We have to be careful about ossification.

In order to address the comments on ossification, we adde= d a new section 6 to explain the rules to processing the MUD (D)TLS rules t= o handle unknown TLS parameters and updated Section 10 to enable faster upd= ate to the YANG module. Please see=C2=A0https://github.com/tireddy2/MUD-TLS-profile/blob/master/draft-r= eddy-opsawg-mud-tls-06.txt

-Tiru
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