[TLS] Re: [EXT] Re: WG Adoption Call for ML-KEM Post-Q uantum Key Agreement for TLS 1.3

[S Moonesamy <[e-mail]>]

Hi Uri,
At 10:23 AM 17-04-2025, Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL wrote:
>You consider pure-PQ risks – then don't usee it. 
>I consider risks associated with hybrids, so my 
>deployment will not use them. To each his own.

According to a draft authored by Reddy and 
Tschofenig, "Pure PQC Key Exchange may be 
required for specific deployments with regulatory 
or compliance mandates".  The authors then go on 
to list "high-security environments" as an 
example of where Pure PQC Key Exchange is 
required.   An assessment of risks would be different in such environments.

The web browser vendors decide which algorithm(s) 
to deploy at my location.  That's usually how it 
works for everyday use.  I doubt that the 
everyday user would be asking for compliance with 
the (U.S.) FIPS 203 standard (please see Section 
1.1 of 
draft-connolly-tls-mlkem-key-agreement-05);  It's 
unlikely that the user would have heard of 
"FIPS".  It could be different in other parts of the world.

>Don't try to stuff your perception of risks and 
>correctness into everybody else's throat.

The above sentence seems a bit strong.

Regards,
S. Moonesamy