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Re: [TLS] Publication of draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility-00

"Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com> Thu, 19 October 2017 14:26 UTC

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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Paul Turner <PAUL.TURNER@venafi.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Publication of draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility-00
Thread-Index: AQHTO71yMz3yJYxp1UWiK0P85Z38q6LqPDwAgAFTKoCAAAWQgIAAANmAgAABFQCAAAA7gIAAAPWA
Date: Thu, 19 Oct 2017 14:26:29 +0000
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/mg-gea4jNuqXulGIhOwZt5ji4WA>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Publication of draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility-00
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    > I didn’t say easy, I said ‘easier’
    > 
    Can you explain how it is easier?
    
There’s no way to limit it to the use-case it was putatively intended for.  We now have a signaling mechanism that says “allow interception.”  Firewalls can drop connections where the client doesn’t send that extension. Therefore they can force only tappable TLS traffic. This makes the job easier.

I take it you want to see this draft adopted?

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