[TLS] [Editorial Errata Reported] RFC5246 (2165)

RFC Errata System <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org> Mon, 19 April 2010 21:47 UTC

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Cc: nmalykh@protocols.ru, tls@ietf.org, rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org
Subject: [TLS] [Editorial Errata Reported] RFC5246 (2165)
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The following errata report has been submitted for RFC5246,
"The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2".

--------------------------------------
You may review the report below and at:
http://www.rfc-editor.org/errata_search.php?rfc=5246&eid=2165

--------------------------------------
Type: Editorial
Reported by: Nikolai Malykh <nmalykh@protocols.ru>;

Section: 6.2.3.2

Original Text
-------------
   Example: If the block length is 8 bytes, the content length
   (TLSCompressed.length) is 61 bytes, and the MAC length is 20 bytes,
   then the length before padding is 82 bytes (this does not include the



Dierks & Rescorla           Standards Track                    [Page 23]

RFC 5246                          TLS                        August 2008


   IV.  Thus, the padding length modulo 8 must be equal to 6 in order to
   make the total length an even multiple of 8 bytes (the block length).
   The padding length can be 6, 14, 22, and so on, through 254.  If the
   padding length were the minimum necessary, 6, the padding would be 6
   bytes, each containing the value 6.  Thus, the last 8 octets of the
   GenericBlockCipher before block encryption would be xx 06 06 06 06 06
   06 06, where xx is the last octet of the MAC.


Corrected Text
--------------
   Example: If the block length is 8 bytes, the content length
   (TLSCompressed.length) is 61 bytes, and the MAC length is 20 bytes,
   then the length before padding is 82 bytes (this does not include the



Dierks & Rescorla           Standards Track                    [Page 23]

RFC 5246                          TLS                        August 2008


   IV).  Thus, the padding length modulo 8 must be equal to 6 in order to
   make the total length an even multiple of 8 bytes (the block length).
   The padding length can be 6, 14, 22, and so on, through 254.  If the
   padding length were the minimum necessary, 6, the padding would be 6
   bytes, each containing the value 6.  Thus, the last 8 octets of the
   GenericBlockCipher before block encryption would be xx 06 06 06 06 06
   06 06, where xx is the last octet of the MAC.


Notes
-----


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--------------------------------------
RFC5246 (draft-ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis-10)
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Title               : The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2
Publication Date    : August 2008
Author(s)           : T. Dierks, E. Rescorla
Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
Source              : Transport Layer Security
Area                : Security
Stream              : IETF
Verifying Party     : IESG