Re: [TLS] padding bug

Ben Laurie <benl@google.com> Tue, 24 September 2013 17:46 UTC

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Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2013 18:46:30 +0100
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From: Ben Laurie <benl@google.com>
To: Hovav Shacham <hovav@cs.ucsd.edu>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] padding bug
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On 24 September 2013 17:31, Hovav Shacham <hovav@cs.ucsd.edu> wrote:
> Peter Gutmann <pgut001 at cs.auckland.ac.nz> writes:
>
>> It seems to be accepted by everyone except the WG chairs
>
>
> I'm not thrilled with making changes to a fundamental part of the TLS design
> through an extension.  TLS is too complicated to analyze already; this
> doesn't help.
>
> I would prefer an approach that deprecates existing suites in favor of
> non-CBC authenticated encryption modes.

That means requiring TLS 1.2, which is a far more complex update to
existing s/w than this change.