Re: [TLS] New draft: draft-solinas-tls-additional-prf-input-00.txt

Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> Wed, 07 October 2009 02:35 UTC

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Date: Tue, 6 Oct 2009 19:36:47 -0700
To: Michael Gray <mickgray@au1.ibm.com>
From: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] New draft: draft-solinas-tls-additional-prf-input-00.txt
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At 11:33 AM +1000 10/7/09, Michael Gray wrote:
>In this case should be this draft also indicate that the client MAY
>generate a fatal "handshake_failure" alert in the event that the Server
>provides insufficient data?
>
>Would this again be true for the Server, if a Client sends insufficient
>data? i.e. A Server MAY generate a fatal "handshake_failure" alert in the
>event that the Client provides insufficient data?

Either side MAY decide for many reasons to stop when they see the other sides's extension. I can add something to this effect to the next draft.

>Additionally, can the Server use the Client size as an indication of how
>much the Server should send? else how does the Client convey a
>minimum/desired requirement information to a Server?

It doesn't. This is really a different set of semantics than the previous draft. We realized that there was too many expectations being signalled, and decided to simplify.

--Paul Hoffman, Director
--VPN Consortium