Re: [TLS] What would make TLS cryptographically better for TLS 1.3

[Ralf Skyper Kaiser <[e-mail]>]

Hi,

someone who can compromise the server to extract the currently used session
keys can also extract all future session keys (or at least is most likely
able to). There is no (practical) need or added security when the session
key is renegotiated every 15 minutes.

ralf



On Sun, Nov 3, 2013 at 8:30 PM, Robert Ransom <[e-mail]>wrote:

> On 11/3/13, Ralf Skyper Kaiser <[e-mail]> wrote:
>
> >> * Applications can also use renegotiation-based rekeying to improve
> >> forward secrecy; for example, the Mixminion specification
> >> (<
> >>
> https://github.com/nmathewson/mixminion-doc/blob/a661212831d2afc3200339b2634ca16452e3aeec/spec/minion-spec.txt
> >> >,
> >> section 4, line 1040) requires that relay-to-relay TLS connections be
> >> rekeyed using renegotiation every 15 minutes for this purpose.
> >>
> >
> > Mixminion falsely assume  that the security degrades if a connection is
> > live for more than 15 minutes. That's security wise not true. In today's
> > security design (TLS) the negotiated session key material is secure for
> > years (if not decades). Gone are the times when DES was used and DES
> could
> > be cracked in 24h and it was desirable to use a new DES key every 24
> hours.
> > Gone. Gone Gone.
> >
> > If you negotiate session keys that could be cracked within a year you
> > should not have negotiated those sessions keys in the first place.
>
> Mixminion correctly assumes that anyone who obtains a session key by
> compromising a server can use that key to decrypt all traffic
> protected by it, no matter how long brute-force search would have
> taken to find the key.
>
>
> Robert Ransom
>