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Re: [TLS] PRs for this morning

mrex@sap.com (Martin Rex) Thu, 13 November 2014 20:00 UTC

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To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Thu, 13 Nov 2014 21:00:37 +0100
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Subject: Re: [TLS] PRs for this morning
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Eric Rescorla wrote:
> 
> Merging session resumption and tickets and moving ticket
> establishment to a update:
> https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/96


In case that you intend to add rfc5077 TLS session ticket support
to TLSv1.3, is that using the same bogus CBC-Encryption
(i.e. mac+pad+encrypt instead of pad+mac+encrypt) that Vaudenay
described as a security issue, that was never fixed in TLS up to v1.2
and provided the grounds for LuckyThirteen and Poodle?

If yes, then how about fixing a known design flaw _before_
it is demonstrated to be exploitable?


-Martin

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