Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS extension RI w/MCSV
"tom.petch" <cfinss@dial.pipex.com> Fri, 11 December 2009 20:04 UTC
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From: "tom.petch" <cfinss@dial.pipex.com>
To: Nelson B Bolyard <nelson@bolyard.me>, tls@ietf.org
References: <200912101613.nBAGD3X2016314@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp><4B216FD0.7060801@extendedsubset.com> <4B21B0E8.1080702@bolyard.me>
Date: Fri, 11 Dec 2009 11:27:33 +0100
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS extension RI w/MCSV
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----- Original Message ----- From: "Nelson B Bolyard" <nelson@bolyard.me> Sent: Friday, December 11, 2009 3:39 AM > On 2009-12-10 14:01 PST, Marsh Ray wrote: > > Martin Rex wrote: > > Seems like SSLv3 was simultaneously one of the most critical protocols > > for net security and orphaned. > > Stop right there. Don't be led down the garden path. > > Look at the parent page. Look at > http://web.archive.org/web/20050205162914/wp.netscape.com/eng/ssl3/ > > It clearly says that "The most recent Draft SSL 3.0 specification, an > Internet Draft dated November 1996, may be viewed here. It is an ASCII > document". It is a link to http://wp.netscape.com/eng/ssl3/draft302.txt > which is draft-freier-ssl-version3-02.txt, now seen at > http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/pki/nss/ssl/draft302.txt Weirder and weirder. Yes, you are right (of course) and I now have a copy of -02. But.... When I go to tools.ietf and ask for draft-freier, it produces -01; if I ask explicitly for -02, it produces -01. Go to Watersprings (which I always do before using tools.ietf) and it tells me of -00 and -01 and that the last was superseded by draft-tls-... So both the ietf archive and the Watersprings archive deny knowledge of -02, which, in any other circumstance, I would take as proof beyond reasonable doubt that there never was a -02. Ah well, they never said the security was easy. Tom Petch > That parent page also says: "The previous draft of the SSL 3.0 > Specification, dated March 1996, may be viewed in this HTML document." > which is a link to > http://web.archive.org/web/20050206124632/wp.netscape.com/eng/ssl3/ssl-toc.html > which in turn has a link to the page Martin cited above. > > You'll find my name in some of those pages, too. Don't let a non-Netscape > person tell you what was, and what was not "official" at Netscape. > > Netscape never orphaned 3.0. It kept the "most recent draft" alive for > the rest of its days, and is still kept alive today at Mozilla.org, which > runs NSS code which is a direct descendant of Netscape's original code.
- [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS extension… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS exten… Marsh Ray
- Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS exten… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS exten… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS exten… Michael Gray
- Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS exten… Marsh Ray
- Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS exten… Dieter Bratko
- Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS exten… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS exten… Marsh Ray
- Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS exten… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS exten… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS exten… Nelson B Bolyard
- Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS exten… Nelson B Bolyard
- Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS exten… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS exten… Nelson B Bolyard
- Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS exten… David-Sarah Hopwood
- Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS exten… Michael Gray
- Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS exten… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS exten… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS exten… Marsh Ray
- Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS exten… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS exten… David-Sarah Hopwood
- Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS exten… tom.petch
- Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS exten… Nelson B Bolyard
- Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS exten… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS exten… Nelson B Bolyard
- Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS exten… Steve Checkoway
- [TLS] Black hole was Re: Analysis of Interop scen… tom.petch
- Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS exten… Michael Gray
- Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS exten… David-Sarah Hopwood
- Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS exten… Michael Gray
- Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS exten… Pasi.Eronen
- Re: [TLS] Black hole was Re: Analysis of Interop … Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Black hole was Re: Analysis of Interop … Pasi.Eronen
- Re: [TLS] Black hole was Re: Analysis of Interop … Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Black hole was Re: Analysis of Interop … Bill Frantz
- Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS exten… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS exten… Marsh Ray