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Re: [TLS] Question about TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA

Stefan Winter <stefan.winter@restena.lu> Mon, 04 July 2011 12:29 UTC

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Date: Mon, 04 Jul 2011 14:29:11 +0200
From: Stefan Winter <stefan.winter@restena.lu>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Question about TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
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Hello,

there I was, naively hoping for a simple "Yes or No" answer :-)

My hopefully acceptable takeaway of this thread is that
TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA *supports* three-key operation, which
would be acceptable as per NIST.

I understand there is also a *risk* that if the dice fall very badly,
the actual encryption strength in that specific TLS session may exhibit
weaker cryptographic strength.

Thanks to all who responded!

Greetings,

Stefan Winter

-- 
Stefan WINTER
Ingenieur de Recherche
Fondation RESTENA - Réseau Téléinformatique de l'Education Nationale et de la Recherche
6, rue Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi
L-1359 Luxembourg

Tel: +352 424409 1
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