Re: [TLS] Ecdsa-sig-value in TLS 1.3 – need for erratum?
Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> Wed, 02 October 2019 11:18 UTC
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From: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Cc: John Mattsson <john.mattsson=40ericsson.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, Dan Brown <danibrown@blackberry.com>, Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>, "TLS@ietf.org" <TLS@ietf.org>
Date: Wed, 02 Oct 2019 13:18:07 +0200
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Ecdsa-sig-value in TLS 1.3 – need for erratum?
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On Tuesday, 1 October 2019 17:01:54 CEST Eric Rescorla wrote: > On Tue, Oct 1, 2019 at 5:27 AM John Mattsson <john.mattsson= > > 40ericsson.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote: > > Dan Brown <danibrown@blackberry.com> wrote: > > > ANSI X9.62-2005 was withdrawn in 2015 > > > > Ok, that TLS 1.3 is relying on a withdrawn publication that used to be > > behind a paywall is even worse. > > Ugh. > > > > Also, I expect FIPS 186-5 is nearly ready, and will specify much of > > > > ECDSA > > > > That NIST FIPS 186-5 will include all the details needed to implement > > ECDSA is great. > > > > >IETF has specs for sigs and their formats already, no? > > > > At the time when RFC 8446 was published, there was probably no quick and > > easy solution to the problem. But the fact that IETF has historically been > > fine with relying on specifications behind paywalls is part of the > > problem. > > If IETF had implemented a strong open-access policy a long-time ago, there > > would probably be an open-access version of ECDSA (NIST or IETF) a long > > time ago.. > > I agree with you about the policy here. To be honest, I just didn't notice > this; and it would probably need some github spelunking to figure out the > history of these references. > > If someone wanted to propose an erratum that would fix this, I would be > very appreciative. I just did propose an erratum for that. -- Regards, Hubert Kario Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team Web: www.cz.redhat.com Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purkyňova 115, 612 00 Brno, Czech Republic
- [TLS] Ecdsa-sig-value in TLS 1.3 – need for errat… Hubert Kario
- Re: [TLS] Ecdsa-sig-value in TLS 1.3 – need for e… Dan Brown
- Re: [TLS] Ecdsa-sig-value in TLS 1.3 – need for e… Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] Ecdsa-sig-value in TLS 1.3 – need for e… Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] Ecdsa-sig-value in TLS 1.3 – need for e… John Mattsson
- Re: [TLS] Ecdsa-sig-value in TLS 1.3 – need for e… Dan Brown
- Re: [TLS] Ecdsa-sig-value in TLS 1.3 – need for e… John Mattsson
- Re: [TLS] Ecdsa-sig-value in TLS 1.3 – need for e… Hubert Kario
- [TLS] (question on ANSI X9.62-2005) Re: Ecdsa-sig… Rene Struik
- Re: [TLS] Ecdsa-sig-value in TLS 1.3 – need for e… Dan Brown
- Re: [TLS] (question on ANSI X9.62-2005) Re: Ecdsa… Dan Brown
- Re: [TLS] Ecdsa-sig-value in TLS 1.3 – need for e… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Ecdsa-sig-value in TLS 1.3 – need for e… Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] Ecdsa-sig-value in TLS 1.3 – need for e… Dan Brown
- Re: [TLS] Ecdsa-sig-value in TLS 1.3 – need for e… John Mattsson
- Re: [TLS] Ecdsa-sig-value in TLS 1.3 – need for e… Hubert Kario
- Re: [TLS] Ecdsa-sig-value in TLS 1.3 – need for e… Hubert Kario
- Re: [TLS] Ecdsa-sig-value in TLS 1.3 – need for e… Hubert Kario
- Re: [TLS] Ecdsa-sig-value in TLS 1.3 – need for e… Sean Turner
- Re: [TLS] Ecdsa-sig-value in TLS 1.3 – need for e… Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL