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Re: [TLS] The TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV time bomb (was: Re: Working Group Last Call for draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00)

Yuhong Bao <yuhongbao_386@hotmail.com> Sat, 18 October 2014 19:10 UTC

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Subject: Re: [TLS] The TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV time bomb (was: Re: Working Group Last Call for draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00)
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Bodo Moeller <bmoeller <at> acm.org> writes:
> Even once we no longer need to worry about extension *intolerant* servers,
we still should take into account that extension *support* remains optional
for TLS servers. Servers can legitimately ignore ClientServer.extensions
entirely. Having a fallback_indication TLS extension would be overly onerous
for such servers: they'd need to implement extension parsing just to be able
to find this one signal. 
MS had to do this in order to backport the TLS renegotiation extension to
XP/Server 2003 back in 2010.

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