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Re: [TLS] Key Control Vulnerability in SRP (Triple Handshake Variant)

Karthikeyan Bhargavan <karthikeyan.bhargavan@inria.fr> Fri, 08 August 2014 21:11 UTC

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From: Karthikeyan Bhargavan <karthikeyan.bhargavan@inria.fr>
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Date: Fri, 08 Aug 2014 17:11:31 -0400
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To: Trevor Perrin <trevp@trevp.net>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Key Control Vulnerability in SRP (Triple Handshake Variant)
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> I haven't followed the triple-handshake discussion closely.  My
> impression is that it's a TLS issue - not an SRP issue - which should
> be fixed by something like [1].
> ….
> [1] http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-bhargavan-tls-session-hash/

Yes, [1] is the current proposal to prevent all triple-handshake-style key synchronisation attacks

The observation here is meant to document that TLS-SRP (not just TLS-RSA and TLS-DHE) also
allows key control, but that this can be easily avoided by some cheap implementation checks.

The main concern may be for for other uses of SRP where [1] may not apply, but I don’t know enough about
such applications to comment.

Best,
-Karthik

> 
> Is that correct?
> 
> Trevor
>

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