[TLS] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate-04
Rich Salz via Datatracker <noreply@ietf.org> Thu, 22 October 2020 19:22 UTC
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Date: Thu, 22 Oct 2020 12:22:29 -0700
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Subject: [TLS] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate-04
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Reviewer: Rich Salz Review result: Has Nits I'm the assigned security directorate reviewer for this draft. This is intended for use by the Sec ADs, but anyone else who gleans wisdom from this message is free to use it as they see fit. The document is READY. There are some nits, which can be found at https://www6.ietf.org/tools/idnits?url=https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate-04.txt or by clicking on the "nits" tab on the datatracker page. Don't use MD5 or SHA1 as digests. If you do, bad people in shadows wearing hoodies will be able to steal your information, impersonate or break your TLS or other connections, and so on. This document gives more rationale and updates some RFC's. This NITS should be fixed, but this should be published.
- [TLS] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-tls-m… Rich Salz via Datatracker
- Re: [TLS] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-t… Sean Turner